相关论文: Output-sensitive Information flow analysis

This paper investigates a flow- and path-sensitive static information flow analysis. Compared with security type systems with fixed labels, it has been shown that flow-sensitive type systems accept more secure programs. We show that an…

Information-flow control systems often enforce progress-insensitive noninterference, as it is simple to understand and enforce. Unfortunately, real programs need to declassify results and endorse inputs, which noninterference disallows,…

Information flow type systems enforce the security property of noninterference by detecting unauthorized data flows at compile-time. However, they require precise type annotations, making them difficult to use in practice as much of the…

Realizing flow security in a concurrent environment is extremely challenging, primarily due to non-deterministic nature of execution. The difficulty is further exacerbated from a security angle if sequential threads disclose control…

Leaking information about the execution behavior of critical real-time tasks may lead to serious consequences, including violations of temporal constraints and even severe failures. We study information leakage for a special class of…

Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable.…

Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…

In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…

Speculative execution attacks undermine the security of constant-time programming, the standard technique used to prevent microarchitectural side channels in security-sensitive software such as cryptographic code. Constant-time code must…

Information flow security is classically formulated in terms of the absence of illegal information flows, with respect to a security setting consisting of a single flow policy that specifies what information flows should be permitted in the…

A program is non-interferent if it leaks no secret information to an observable output. However, non-interference is too strict in many practical cases and quantitative information flow (QIF) has been proposed and studied in depth.…

Information-flow security type systems ensure confidentiality by enforcing noninterference: a program cannot leak private data to public channels. However, in practice, programs need to selectively declassify information about private data.…

Noninterference guarantees that an attacker cannot infer secrets by interacting with a program. Information flow control (IFC) type systems assert noninterference by tracking the level of information learned (pc) and disallowing…

Practitioners of secure information flow often face a design challenge: what is the right semantic treatment of leaks via termination? On the one hand, the potential harm of untrusted code calls for strong progress-sensitive security. On…

Protecting confidential data from leaking is a critical challenge in computer systems, particularly given the growing number of observers on the internet. Therefore, limiting information flow using robust security policies becomes…

Information-flow security typing statically preserves confidentiality by enforcing noninterference. To address the practical need of selective and flexible declassification of confidential information, several approaches have developed a…

Preventing implicit information flows by dynamic program analysis requires coarse approximations that result in false positives, because a dynamic monitor sees only the executed trace of the program. One widely deployed method is the…

In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart from direct and indirect flows a secret information can be leaked through covert timing channels. That is, no two computations of a program…

Leakage of confidential information represents a serious security risk. Despite a number of novel, theoretical advances, it has been unclear if and how quantitative approaches to measuring leakage of confidential information could be…

Information flow analysis is a powerful technique for reasoning about the sensitive information exposed by a program during its execution. While past work has proposed information theoretic metrics (e.g., Shannon entropy, min-entropy,…