相关论文: A Generalized Minimax Q-learning Algorithm for Two…

Two-player graph games have found numerous applications, most notably in the synthesis of reactive systems from temporal specifications, but also in verification. The relevance of infinite-state systems in these areas has lead to…

This paper considers two-player zero-sum finite-horizon Markov games with simultaneous moves. The study focuses on the challenging settings where the value function or the model is parameterized by general function classes. Provably…

This paper introduces state abstraction for two-player zero-sum Markov games (TZMGs), where the payoffs for the two players are determined by the state representing the environment and their respective actions, with state transitions…

We study a game where one player selects a random function, and the other has to guess that function, and show that with high probability the second player can correctly guess most of the random function. We apply this analysis to…

We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, perfect information, mean payoff criteria, without any irreducibility assumption on the Markov chains associated to strategies (multichain games). The value of such…

We analyze the convergence properties of the two-timescale fictitious play combining the classical fictitious play with the Q-learning for two-player zero-sum stochastic games with player-dependent learning rates. We show its almost sure…

In this work, we present the first finite-time analysis of Q-learning with time-varying learning policies (i.e., on-policy sampling) for discounted Markov decision processes under minimal assumptions, requiring only the existence of a…

We study reinforcement learning for two-player zero-sum Markov games with simultaneous moves in the finite-horizon setting, where the transition kernel of the underlying Markov games can be parameterized by a linear function over the…

The goal of this paper is to propose a new Q-learning algorithm with a dummy adversarial player, which is called dummy adversarial Q-learning (DAQ), that can effectively regulate the overestimation bias in standard Q-learning. With the…

Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) -- where multiple agents learn to interact in a shared dynamic environment -- permeates across a wide range of critical applications. While there has been substantial progress on understanding the…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

This paper studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, with the goal of learning Nash equilibria or coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) sample-optimally. All prior results suffer from at least one of the two obstacles: the…

We examine online safe multi-agent reinforcement learning using constrained Markov games in which agents compete by maximizing their expected total rewards under a constraint on expected total utilities. Our focus is confined to an episodic…

Learning algorithm design for state-based games is investigated. A heuristic uncoupled learning algorithm, which is a two memory better reply with inertia dynamics, is proposed. Under certain reasonable conditions it is proved that for any…

In this paper, we present an online learning approach for two-player zero-sum linear quadratic games with unknown dynamics. We develop a framework combining regularized least squares model estimation, high probability confidence sets, and…

This paper addresses the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium in $\gamma$-discounted multiplayer general-sum Markov Games (MG). A key component of this model is the possibility for the players to either collaborate or team apart to…

We focus on the design of algorithms for finding equilibria in 2-player zero-sum games. Although it is well known that such problems can be solved by a single linear program, there has been a surge of interest in recent years for simpler…

We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…

Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…

Differential games, in particular two-player sequential zero-sum games (a.k.a. minimax optimization), have been an important modeling tool in applied science and received renewed interest in machine learning due to many recent applications,…