相关论文: Double-Auction Mechanisms for Resource Trading Mar…

Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al.…

This paper presents a comprehensive analytical study of two competitive cognitive operators' spectrum leasing and pricing strategies, taking into account operators' heterogeneity in leasing costs and users' heterogeneity in transmission…

This paper studies the use of a multi-attribute auction in a communication system to bring about efficient relaying in a non-cooperative setting. We consider a system where a source seeks to offload data to an access point (AP) while…

A mobile cloud computing system is composed of heterogeneous services and resources to be allocated by the cloud service provider to mobile cloud users. On one hand, some of these resources are substitutable (e.g., users can use storage…

In multi-hop secondary networks, bidding strategies for spectrum auction, route selection and relaying incentives should be jointly considered to establish multi-hop communication. In this paper, a framework for joint resource bidding and…

We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…

We initiate the study of two-sided online resource allocation with costly cancellations. Our focus is on edge-weighted online bipartite matching (and several of its extensions), where nodes arrive online and request offline resources. In…

This paper studies the use of a multi-attribute auction in a communication system to bring about efficient relaying in a non-cooperative setting. We consider a system where a source seeks to offload data to an access point (AP) while…

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's revenue and the allocation efficiency, are generally…

Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…

Increasing number of the cloud-based Internet applications demands for efficient resource and cost management. This paper proposes a real-time group auction system for the cloud instance market. The system is designed based on a…

The Internet of Agents (IoA) is rapidly gaining prominence as a foundational architecture for interconnected intelligent systems, designed to facilitate seamless discovery, communication, and collaborative reasoning among a vast network of…

A multi-agent optimization problem motivated by the management of energy systems is discussed. The associated cost function is separable and convex although not necessarily strongly convex and there exist edge-based coupling equality…

A linear function submission-based double-auction (LFS-DA) mechanism for a regional electricity network is proposed in this paper. Each agent in the network is equipped with a battery and a generator. Each agent simultaneously becomes a…

Crowdsourced wireless community networks can effectively alleviate the limited coverage issue of Wi-Fi access points (APs), by encouraging individuals (users) to share their private residential Wi-Fi APs with others. In this paper, we…

In a two-sided marketplace, network effects are crucial for competitiveness, and platforms need to retain users through advanced customer relationship management as much as possible. Maintaining numerous providers' stable and active…

We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons…

We study the problem of fair online resource allocation via non-monetary mechanisms, where multiple agents repeatedly share a resource without monetary transfers. Previous work has shown that every agent can guarantee $1/2$ of their ideal…

We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…

This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…