相关论文: Control Behavior Integrity for Distributed Cyber-P…

Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are the core control devices in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs), which control and monitor the underlying physical plants such as power grids. PLCs were initially designed to work in a trusted…

As cyber-physical systems (CPSs) become more dependent on data and communication networks, their vulnerability to false data injection (FDI) attacks has raised significant concerns. Among these, stealthy attacks, those that evade…

The integration of communication networks and the Internet of Things (IoT) in Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) increases their vulnerability towards cyber-attacks, causing devastating outcomes. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems…

Industrial control systems (ICS) of critical infrastructure are increasingly connected to the Internet for remote site management at scale. However, cyber attacks against ICS - especially at the communication channels between humanmachine…

The increase in network connectivity has also resulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems. An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely affect control performance by tampering with sensor…

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) integrate sensing, communication, computation, and control to support critical infrastructure, including smart grids, industrial automation, and control systems. In the electrical utility domain, various…

We consider the problem of provably securing a given control loop implementation in the presence of adversarial interventions on data exchange between plant and controller. Such interventions can be thwarted using continuously operating…

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) provide profitable surfaces for hardware attacks such as hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans can implement stealthy attacks such as leaking critical information, taking control of devices or harm humans. In this…

Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can lead to significant physical damage. While offline safety and security assessments can provide insight into vulnerable system components, they may not account for stealthy attacks designed to…

In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of information that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of information present in the source code. In a cyber-physical system, information flows are not only present at…

Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) rely on insecure protocols and devices to monitor and operate critical infrastructure. Prior work has demonstrated that powerful attackers with detailed system knowledge can manipulate exchanged sensor data…

Industrial control systems are critical to the operation of industrial facilities, especially for critical infrastructures, such as refineries, power grids, and transportation systems. Similar to other information systems, a significant…

Modern Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) allow remote communication through the Internet using industrial protocols that were not designed to work with external networks. To understand security issues related to this practice, prior work…

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) encompassing resources for process automation are subjected to a wide variety of security threats. The threat landscape is arising due to increased adoption of Commercial-of-the-shelf (COTS) products as well…

In this paper, the problem of simultaneous cyber attack and fault detection and isolation (CAFDI) in cyber-physical systems (CPS) is studied. The proposed solution methodology consists of two filters on the plant and the command and control…

Modern Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition SCADA systems used by the electric utility industry to monitor and control electric power generation, transmission and distribution are recognized today as critical components of the electric…

In critical infrastructures, communication networks are used to exchange vital data among elements of Industrial Control Systems (ICSes). Due to the criticality of such systems and the increase of the cybersecurity risks in these contexts,…

This work establishes a game-theoretic framework to study cross-layer coordinated attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). The attacker can interfere with the physical process and launch jamming attacks on the communication channels…

Operational Technology (OT) networks of industrial control systems (ICS) are increasingly connected to the public Internet, which has prompted ICSes to implement strong security measures (e.g., authentication and encryption) to protect…

We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks, and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we…