相关论文: Processor Hardware Security Vulnerabilities and th…

Trusted Platform Modules constitute an integral building block of modern security features. Moreover, as Windows 11 made a TPM 2.0 mandatory, they are subject to an ever-increasing academic challenge. While discrete TPMs - as found in…

In this work, we identify a set of side-channels in our Confidential Federated Compute platform that a hypothetical insider could exploit to circumvent differential privacy (DP) guarantees. We show how DP can mitigate two of the…

Computer network is unpredictable due to information warfare and is prone to various attacks. Such attacks on network compromise the most important attribute, the privacy. Most of such attacks are devised using special communication channel…

Caches have become the prime method for unintended information extraction across logical isolation boundaries. Even Spectre and Meltdown rely on the cache side channel, as it provides great resolution and is widely available on all major…

Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…

Graphics processing unit (GPU), although a powerful performance-booster, also has many security vulnerabilities. Due to these, the GPU can act as a safe-haven for stealthy malware and the weakest `link' in the security `chain'. In this…

A recent discovery of a new class of microarchitectural attacks called Spectre picked up the attention of the security community as these attacks can circumvent many traditional mechanisms of defense. One of the attacks---Bounds Check…

In the presence of security countermeasures, a malware designed for data exfiltration must do so using a covert channel to achieve its goal. Among existing covert channels stands the domain name system (DNS) protocol. Although the detection…

Many organizations protect secure networked devices from non-secure networked devices by assigning each class of devices to a different logical network. These two logical networks, commonly called the host network and the guest network, use…

The disclosure of the Spectre speculative-execution attacks in January 2018 has left a severe vulnerability that systems are still struggling with how to patch. The solutions that currently exist tend to have incomplete coverage, perform…

Spectre attacks and their many subsequent variants are a new vulnerability class affecting modern CPUs. The attacks rely on the ability to misguide speculative execution, generally by exploiting the branch prediction structures, to execute…

This paper provides the first systematic analysis of a synergistic threat model encompassing memory corruption vulnerabilities and microarchitectural side-channel vulnerabilities. We study speculative shield bypass attacks that leverage…

The recent Spectre attacks exploit speculative execution, a pervasively used feature of modern microprocessors, to allow the exfiltration of sensitive data across protection boundaries. In this paper, we introduce a new Spectre-class attack…

Speculative execution is an optimization technique that has been part of CPUs for over a decade. It predicts the outcome and target of branch instructions to avoid stalling the execution pipeline. However, until recently, the security…

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…

Logic locking protects an IC from threats such as piracy of design IP and unauthorized overproduction throughout the IC supply chain. Out of the several techniques proposed by the research community, provably-secure logic locking (PSLL) has…

Side channel attacks have emerged as a serious threat to the security of both networked and embedded systems -- in particular through the implementations of cryptographic operations. Side channels can be difficult to model formally, but…

Highly privileged software, such as firmware, is an attractive target for attackers. Thus, BIOS vendors use cryptographic signatures to ensure firmware integrity at boot time. Nevertheless, such protection does not prevent an attacker from…

Software-exploitable Hardware Trojans (HTs) enable attackers to execute unauthorized software or gain illicit access to privileged operations. This manuscript introduces a hardware-based methodology for detecting runtime HT activations…

Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…