相关论文: DeepCorr: Strong Flow Correlation Attacks on Tor U…

Tor is a widely used anonymity network that conceals user identities by routing traffic through encrypted relays, yet it remains vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks that deanonymize users by matching patterns in ingress and egress…

Flow correlation attacks is an efficient network attacks, aiming to expose those who use anonymous network services, such as Tor. Conducting such attacks during the early stages of network communication is particularly critical for…

Previous attacks that link the sender and receiver of traffic in the Tor network ("correlation attacks") have generally relied on analyzing traffic from TCP connections. The TCP connections of a typical client application, however, are…

The network flow watermarking technique associates the two communicating parties by actively modifying certain characteristics of the stream generated by the sender so that it covertly carries some special marking information. Some curious…

Tor, a widely utilized privacy network, enables anonymous communication but is vulnerable to flow correlation attacks that deanonymize users by correlating traffic patterns from Tor's ingress and egress segments. Various defenses have been…

Several studies have shown that the network traffic that is generated by a visit to a website over Tor reveals information specific to the website through the timing and sizes of network packets. By capturing traffic traces between users…

Deciding that two network flows are essentially the same is an important problem in intrusion detection and in tracing anonymous connections. A stepping stone or an anonymity network may try to prevent flow correlation by adding chaff…

We present the Waterfilling circuit selection method, which we designed in order to mitigate the risks of a successful end-to-end traffic correlation attack. Waterfilling proceeds by balancing the Tor network load as evenly as possible on…

While anonymity networks like Tor aim to protect the privacy of their users, they are vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks such as Website Fingerprinting (WF) and Flow Correlation (FC). Recent implementations of WF and FC attacks, such as…

Low-latency anonymity networks such as Tor remain vulnerable to infrastructure-level traffic analysis that exploits side-channel information observable from encrypted communications. We introduce NATA, a non-invasive active…

Anonymity systems such as Tor aim to enable users to communicate in a manner that is untraceable by adversaries that control a small number of machines. To provide efficient service to users, these anonymity systems make full use of…

Network-on-Chip (NoC) is widely used to facilitate communication between components in sophisticated System-on-Chip (SoC) designs. Security of the on-chip communication is crucial because exploiting any vulnerability in shared NoC would be…

Tor is vulnerable to network-level adversaries who can observe both ends of the communication to deanonymize users. Recent work has shown that Tor is susceptible to the previously unknown active BGP routing attacks, called RAPTOR attacks,…

The Tor network is the most prominent system for providing anonymous communication to web users, with a daily user base of 2 million users. However, since its inception, it has been constantly targeted by various traffic fingerprinting and…

TOR (The Onion Router) network is a widely used open source anonymous communication tool, the abuse of TOR makes it difficult to monitor the proliferation of online crimes such as to access criminal websites. Most existing approches for TOR…

Tor is currently one of the more popular systems for anonymizing near real-time communications on the Internet. Recently, Borisov et al. proposed a denial of service based attack on Tor (and related systems) that significantly increases the…

The Tor network provides users with strong anonymity by routing their internet traffic through multiple relays. While Tor encrypts traffic and hides IP addresses, it remains vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks such as the website…

Tor users are vulnerable to deanonymization by an adversary that can observe some Tor relays or some parts of the network. We demonstrate that previous network-aware path-selection algorithms that propose to solve this problem are…

After carefully considering the scalability problem in Tor and exhaustively evaluating related works on AS-level adversaries, the author proposes ASmoniTor, which is an autonomous system monitor for mitigating correlation attacks in the Tor…

In recent years, there have been several works that use website fingerprinting techniques to enable a local adversary to determine which website a Tor user visits. While the current state-of-the-art attack, which uses deep learning,…