相关论文: What game are we playing? End-to-end learning in n…

With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to agent actions. Although a recent work provides a…

In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…

In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…

End-to-end learning refers to training a possibly complex learning system by applying gradient-based learning to the system as a whole. End-to-end learning system is specifically designed so that all modules are differentiable. In effect,…

This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…

We consider a scenario in which two reinforcement learning agents repeatedly play a matrix game against each other and update their parameters after each round. The agents' decision-making is transparent to each other, which allows each…

In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…

We present an end-to-end learning method for chess, relying on deep neural networks. Without any a priori knowledge, in particular without any knowledge regarding the rules of chess, a deep neural network is trained using a combination of…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…

In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game's payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these…

We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve…

Estimating the unknown reward functions driving agents' behaviors is of central interest in inverse reinforcement learning and game theory. To tackle this problem, we develop a unified framework for reward function recovery in two-player…

We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…

We train two neural networks adversarially to play static games. At each iteration, a row and column network observe a new random bimatrix game and output individual mixed strategies. The parameters of each network are independently updated…

Mean Field Game systems describe equilibrium configurations in differential games with infinitely many infinitesimal interacting agents. We introduce a learning procedure (similar to the Fictitious Play) for these games and show its…

We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…

This position paper argues that machine learning for scientific discovery should shift from inductive pattern recognition to axiom-based reasoning. We propose a game design framework in which scientific inquiry is recast as a rule-evolving…

A valuation for a player in a game in extensive form is an assignment of numeric values to the players moves. The valuation reflects the desirability moves. We assume a myopic player, who chooses a move with the highest valuation.…