相关论文: A Theorem for Secrecy in Tagged Protocols Using th…

In this paper, we show how practical the little theorem of witness functions is in detecting security flaws in some category of cryptographic protocols. We convey a formal analysis of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol in the…

In this paper, we present a new semi-decidable procedure to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy based on a new class of functions that we call: the Witness-Functions. A Witness-Function is a reliable function that guarantees the…

In this paper, we use the witness-functions to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy under nonempty equational theories. The witness-functions are safe metrics used to compute security. An analysis with a witness-function consists in…

In this paper, we present a new formal method to analyze cryptographic protocols statically for the property of secrecy. It consists in inspecting the level of security of every component in the protocol and making sure that it does not…

Witness functions have recently been introduced in cryptographic protocols' literature as a new powerful way to prove protocol correctness with respect to secrecy. In this paper, we extend them to the property of authentication. We show how…

Proving that a cryptographic protocol is correct for secrecy is a hard task. One of the strongest strategies to reach this goal is to show that it is increasing, which means that the security level of every single atomic message exchanged…

The verification of security protocols is essential, in order to ensure the absence of potential attacks. However, verification results are only valid with respect to the assumptions under which the verification was performed. These…

In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…

A new proposal for group key exchange is introduced which proves to be both efficient and secure and compares favorably with state of the art protocols.

In this paper, we look at the property of secrecy through the growth of the protocol. Intuitively, an increasing protocol preserves the secret. For that, we need functions to estimate the security of messages. Here, we give relaxed…

In the paper we introduce a process model of security protocols, where processes are graphs with edges labelled by actions, and present a new method of specification and verification of security protocols based on this model.

Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…

Security protocols often use randomization to achieve probabilistic non-determinism. This non-determinism, in turn, is used in obfuscating the dependence of observable values on secret data. Since the correctness of security protocols is…

A computational secret-sharing scheme is a method that enables a dealer, that has a secret, to distribute this secret among a set of parties such that a "qualified" subset of parties can efficiently reconstruct the secret while any…

In this tutorial, selected topics of cryptology and of computational complexity theory are presented. We give a brief overview of the history and the foundations of classical cryptography, and then move on to modern public-key cryptography.…

Security protocols are essential building blocks of modern IT systems. Subtle flaws in their design or implementation may compromise the security of entire systems. It is, thus, important to prove the absence of such flaws through formal…

In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) show that, when…

Transparency protocols are protocols whose actions can be publicly monitored by observers (such observers may include regulators, rights advocacy groups, or the general public). The observed actions are typically usages of private keys such…

Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…

In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch & Turuani (2003) show that, when…