相关论文: Limiting gaming opportunities on incentive-based d…

This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg…

Most demand management approaches with non-mandatory policies assume full users' cooperation, which may not be the case given users' beliefs, needs and preferences. In this paper we propose a mechanism for demand management including…

Autonomous agents optimize the reward function we give them. What they don't know is how hard it is for us to design a reward function that actually captures what we want. When designing the reward, we might think of some specific training…

In this paper, we consider the problem of optimal demand response and energy storage management for a power consuming entity. The entity's objective is to find an optimal control policy for deciding how much load to consume, how much power…

Incentive design constitutes a foundational paradigm for influencing the behavior of strategic agents, wherein a system planner (principal) publicly commits to an incentive mechanism designed to align individual objectives with collective…

Game theory offers an interpretable mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent interactions. However, its applicability in real-world robotics applications is hindered by several challenges, such as unknown agents' preferences and…

Utilities and transmission system operators (TSO) around the world implement demand response programs for reducing electricity consumption by sending information on the state of balance between supply demand to end-use consumers. We…

We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…

Within the context of renewable energy communities, this paper focuses on optimal operation of producers equipped with energy storage systems in the presence of demand response. A novel strategy for optimal scheduling of the storage systems…

This paper studies the automated control method for regulating air conditioner (AC) loads in incentive-based residential demand response (DR). The critical challenge is that the customer responses to load adjustment are uncertain and…

Current DER coordination schemes, such as demand-response and VPPs, aim to reduce electricity costs during peak demand events with no consideration of distribution grid reliability. We show that coordinating DERs for grid reliability can…

Competition has been introduced in the electricity markets with the goal of reducing prices and improving efficiency. The basic idea which stays behind this choice is that, in competitive markets, a greater quantity of the good is exchanged…

Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…

We consider the setting in which an electric power utility seeks to curtail its peak electricity demand by offering a fixed group of customers a uniform price for reductions in consumption relative to their predetermined baselines. The…

Demand-side management (DSM) enables distribution system operators (DSOs) to steer electricity consumption through dynamic price signals or incentive mechanisms, thereby leveraging end-users' flexibility potential for delivering grid…

The paper addresses a problem of sequential bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We proposed a decision model that helps agents to successfully bargain by performing indirect negotiation and learning the opponent's model.…

In strategic games such as the prisoner's dilemma, allowing players to make binding offers of utility transfers before play has been shown to alter incentives and potentially support cooperative outcomes. These preplay exchange mechanisms…

In this paper, we introduce and study a class of games called price-coupling games that arise in many scenarios, especially in the electricity industry. In a price-coupling game, there is a part of the objective function of a player which…

In this paper, the interactions and energy exchange decisions of a number of geographically distributed storage units are studied under decision-making involving end-users. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated between…

Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…