相关论文: Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in neutral po…

We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…

In this Letter, we study how cooperation is organized in complex topologies by analyzing the evolutionary (replicator) dynamics of the Prisoner's Dilemma, a two-players game with two available strategies, defection and cooperation, whose…

The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be…

In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the personal features. Now we investigate how an artificially imposed restricted ability to reproduce, overruling ones fitness, affects an…

Spatial structure is one of the simplest and most studied ecological factors that affect the evolution of cooperation. It has been shown that spatial reciprocity promotes cooperation due to the formation of cooperative clusters, which…

The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether or not competitors also interact. Population…

Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a biological population affects which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been…

Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…

People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group structure affects the way people cooperate, and how they…

Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…

Pro-social punishment is a key driver of harmonious and stable society. However, this institution is vulnerable to corruption since law-violators can avoid sanctioning by paying bribes to corrupt law-enforcers. Consequently, to understand…

The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in…

We study the cooperation problem in the framework of evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. Considering the growing process of the system and individuals with imitation capacity, we show conditions…

Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to…

The pursuit of highest payoffs in evolutionary social dilemmas is risky and sometimes inferior to conformity. Choosing the most common strategy within the interaction range is safer because it ensures that the payoff of an individual will…

Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between…

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation…

The functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic driving…

Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…