相关论文: Leaking Uninitialized Secure Enclave Memory via St…

The widening availability of hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) has been accelerating the adaptation of new applications using TEEs. Recent studies showed that a cloud application consists of multiple distributed software…

The big data industry is facing new challenges as concerns about privacy leakage soar. One of the remedies to privacy breach incidents is to encapsulate computations over sensitive data within hardware-assisted Trusted Execution…

While the security of the cloud remains a concern, a common practice is to encrypt data before outsourcing them for utilization. One key challenging issue is how to efficiently perform queries over the ciphertext. Conventional crypto-based…

This paper shows how an attacker can break the confidentiality of a hardware enclave with Membuster, an off-chip attack based on snooping the memory bus. An attacker with physical access can observe an unencrypted address bus and extract…

A promising approach for designing critical embedded systems is based on virtualization technologies and multi-core platforms. These enable the deployment of both real-time and general-purpose systems with different criticalities in a…

Recent transient-execution attacks, such as RIDL, Fallout, and ZombieLoad, demonstrated that attackers can leak information while it transits through microarchitectural buffers. Named Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) by Intel, these…

Encrypting data before sending it to the cloud protects it against hackers and malicious insiders, but requires the cloud to compute on encrypted data. Trusted (hardware) modules, e.g., secure enclaves like Intel's SGX, can very efficiently…

Recent attacks have broken process isolation by exploiting microarchitectural side channels that allow indirect access to shared microarchitectural state. Enclaves strengthen the process abstraction to restore isolation guarantees. We…

Data confidentiality is an important requirement for clients when outsourcing databases to the cloud. Trusted execution environments, such as Intel SGX, offer an efficient, hardware-based solution to this cryptographic problem. Existing…

New types of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) architectures like TrustLite and Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are emerging. They bring new features that can lead to innovative security and privacy solutions. But each new TEE…

To mitigate interrupt-based stepping attacks (notably using SGX-Step), Intel introduced AEX-Notify, an ISA extension to Intel SGX that aims to prevent deterministic single-stepping. In this work, we introduce AEX-NStep, the first interrupt…

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) local and remote attestation mechanisms enable an enclave to attest its identity (i.e., the enclave measurement, which is the cryptographic hash of its initial code and data) to an enclave. To verify…

Beyond point solutions, the vision of edge computing is to enable web services to deploy their edge functions in a multi-tenant infrastructure present at the edge of mobile networks. However, edge functions can be rendered useless because…

Mitigating memory-access attacks on the Intel SGX architecture is an important and open research problem. A natural notion of the mitigation is cache-miss obliviousness which requires the cache-misses emitted during an enclave execution are…

A trusted execution environment (TEE) such as Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) runs a remote attestation to prove to a data owner the integrity of the initial state of an enclave, including the program to operate on her data. For this…

Data exfiltration attacks have led to huge data breaches. Recently, the Equifax attack affected 147M users and a third-party library - Apache Struts - was alleged to be responsible for it. These attacks often exploit the fact that sensitive…

This paper proposes a system, entitled Concealer that allows sharing time-varying spatial data (e.g., as produced by sensors) in encrypted form to an untrusted third-party service provider to provide location-based applications (involving…

We present a practical framework to deploy privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) applications in untrusted clouds based on a trusted execution environment (TEE). Specifically, we shield unmodified PyTorch ML applications by running…

The recent Spectre attacks have demonstrated that modern microarchitectural optimizations can make software insecure. These attacks use features like pipelining, out-of-order and speculation to extract information about the memory contents…

With the evolution of computer systems, the amount of sensitive data to be stored as well as the number of threats on these data grow up, making the data confidentiality increasingly important to computer users. Currently, with devices…