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Enforcing integrity and confidentiality of users' application code and data is a challenging mission that any software developer working on an online production grade service is facing. Since cryptology is not a widely understood subject,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-04-04 Mohammad Hasanzadeh Mofrad , Adam Lee

This paper presents SgxPectre Attacks that exploit the recently disclosed CPU bugs to subvert the confidentiality and integrity of SGX enclaves. Particularly, we show that when branch prediction of the enclave code can be influenced by…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-09-12 Guoxing Chen , Sanchuan Chen , Yuan Xiao , Yinqian Zhang , Zhiqiang Lin , Ten H. Lai

Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a hardware-based technology for ensuring security of sensitive data from disclosure or modification that enables user-level applications to allocate protected areas of memory called enclaves. Such…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-11-01 Rodolfo Silva , Pedro Barbosa , Andrey Brito

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-02-27 Ferdinand Brasser , Urs Müller , Alexandra Dmitrienko , Kari Kostiainen , Srdjan Capkun , Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2020-07-17 Tobias Cloosters , Michael Rodler , Lucas Davi

Intel SGX (Software Guard Extension) is a promising TEE (trusted execution environment) technique that can protect programs running in user space from being maliciously accessed by the host operating system. Although it provides hardware…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-08-24 Yang Chen , Jianfeng Jiang , Shoumeng Yan , Hui Xu

Intel has introduced a trusted computing technology, Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), which provides an isolated and secure execution environment called enclave for a user program without trusting any privilege software (e.g., an…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-11-14 Jinwen Wang , Yueqiang Cheng , Qi Li , Yong Jiang

Modern processors can offer hardware primitives that allow a process to run in isolation. These primitives implement a trusted execution environment (TEE) in which a program can run such that the integrity and confidentiality of its…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2021-05-14 Pedro Antonino , Wojciech Aleksander Wołoszyn , A. W. Roscoe

Malware attacks are a significant part of the new software security threats detected each year. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are a set of hardware instructions introduced by Intel in their recent lines of processors that are…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2020-09-24 Vlad Crăciun , Pascal Felber , Andrei Mogage , Emanuel Onica , Rafael Pires

In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-05-23 Michael Schwarz , Samuel Weiser , Daniel Gruss , Clémentine Maurice , Stefan Mangard

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-10-04 Shohreh Hosseinzadeh , Hans Liljestrand , Ville Leppänen , Andrew Paverd

Application size and complexity are the underlying cause of numerous security vulnerabilities in code. In order to mitigate the risks arising from such vulnerabilities, various techniques have been proposed to isolate the execution of…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-06-12 Ahmad Atamli-Reineh , Andrew Martin

Since its debut, SGX has been used in many applications, e.g., secure data processing. However, previous systems usually assume a trusted enclave and ignore the security issues caused by an untrusted enclave. For instance, a vulnerable (or…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2020-10-26 Yuan Chen , Jiaqi Li , Guorui Xu , Yajin Zhou , Zhi Wang , Cong Wang , Kui Ren

Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guarantees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However, their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-10-04 Fritz Alder , Arseny Kurnikov , Andrew Paverd , N. Asokan

Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. Known defenses have major…

Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-12-29 Yuzhe Tang , Kai Li , Yibo Wang , Jiaqi Chen , Cheng Xu

Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves, yet there is an ongoing debate on whether this threat…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-02-12 Michael Schwarz , Samuel Weiser , Daniel Gruss

Intel's software guard extensions (SGX) provide hardware enclaves to guarantee confidentiality and integrity for sensitive code and data. However, systems leveraging such security mechanisms must often pay high performance overheads. A…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-07-10 Peterson Yuhala , Michael Paper , Timothée Zerbib , Pascal Felber , Valerio Schiavoni , Alain Tchana

In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-06-05 Sangho Lee , Ming-Wei Shih , Prasun Gera , Taesoo Kim , Hyesoon Kim , Marcus Peinado

We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2021-06-08 Ivan Puddu , Moritz Schneider , Miro Haller , Srdjan Čapkun
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