相关论文: CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache At…

As modern systems increasingly rely on GPUs for computationally intensive tasks such as machine learning acceleration, ensuring the integrity of GPU computation has become critically important. Recent studies have shown that GPU kernels are…

We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach dynamically…

While the security of the cloud remains a concern, a common practice is to encrypt data before outsourcing them for utilization. One key challenging issue is how to efficiently perform queries over the ciphertext. Conventional crypto-based…

Hardware support for trusted execution in modern CPUs enables tenants to shield their data processing workloads in otherwise untrusted cloud environments. Runtime systems for the trusted execution must rely on an interface to the untrusted…

Intel software guard extensions (SGX) aims to provide an isolated execution environment, known as an enclave, for a user-level process to maximize its confidentiality and integrity. In this paper, we study how uninitialized data inside a…

Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a hardware-based technology for ensuring security of sensitive data from disclosure or modification that enables user-level applications to allocate protected areas of memory called enclaves. Such…

Shared cache resources in multi-core processors are vulnerable to cache side-channel attacks. Recently proposed defenses have their own caveats: Randomization-based defenses are vulnerable to the evolving attack algorithms besides relying…

Shared caches are vulnerable to side channel attacks through contention in cache sets. Besides being a simple source of information leak, these side channels form useful gadgets for more sophisticated attacks that compromise the security of…

Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guarantees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However, their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud…

Machine learning has become a critical component of modern data-driven online services. Typically, the training phase of machine learning techniques requires to process large-scale datasets which may contain private and sensitive…

In the last 10 years, cache attacks on Intel x86 CPUs have gained increasing attention among the scientific community and powerful techniques to exploit cache side channels have been developed. However, modern smartphones use one or more…

Encrypting data before sending it to the cloud protects it against hackers and malicious insiders, but requires the cloud to compute on encrypted data. Trusted (hardware) modules, e.g., secure enclaves like Intel's SGX, can very efficiently…

The deployment of large-scale distributed systems, e.g., publish-subscribe platforms, that operate over sensitive data using the infrastructure of public cloud providers, is nowadays heavily hindered by the surging lack of trust toward the…

Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…

Cache side channel attacks are a sophisticated and persistent threat that exploit vulnerabilities in modern processors to extract sensitive information. These attacks leverage weaknesses in shared computational resources, particularly the…

Cache attacks pose a threat to any code whose execution flow or memory accesses depend on sensitive information. Especially in public clouds, where caches are shared across several tenants, cache attacks remain an unsolved problem. Cache…

In this work we present the Secure Machine, SeM for short, a CPU architecture extension for secure computing. SeM uses a small amount of in-chip additional hardware that monitors key communication channels inside the CPU chip, and only acts…

Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…

In this paper we investigate the feasibility of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on shared caches in multicore platforms. With carefully engineered attacker tasks, we are able to cause more than 300X execution time increases on a victim task…

Cache timing attacks allow third-party observers to retrieve sensitive information from program executions. But, is it possible to automatically check the vulnerability of a program against cache timing attacks and then, automatically…