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相关论文: Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cach…

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Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-02-27 Ferdinand Brasser , Urs Müller , Alexandra Dmitrienko , Kari Kostiainen , Srdjan Capkun , Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi

In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-08-22 Ahmad Moghimi , Gorka Irazoqui , Thomas Eisenbarth

Malware attacks are a significant part of the new software security threats detected each year. Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) are a set of hardware instructions introduced by Intel in their recent lines of processors that are…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2020-09-24 Vlad Crăciun , Pascal Felber , Andrei Mogage , Emanuel Onica , Rafael Pires

Intel has introduced a trusted computing technology, Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), which provides an isolated and secure execution environment called enclave for a user program without trusting any privilege software (e.g., an…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-11-14 Jinwen Wang , Yueqiang Cheng , Qi Li , Yong Jiang

Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves, yet there is an ongoing debate on whether this threat…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-02-12 Michael Schwarz , Samuel Weiser , Daniel Gruss

Enforcing integrity and confidentiality of users' application code and data is a challenging mission that any software developer working on an online production grade service is facing. Since cryptology is not a widely understood subject,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-04-04 Mohammad Hasanzadeh Mofrad , Adam Lee

Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-12-29 Yuzhe Tang , Kai Li , Yibo Wang , Jiaqi Chen , Cheng Xu

Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-07-01 Jianyu Jiang , Claudio Soriente , Ghassan Karame

Application size and complexity are the underlying cause of numerous security vulnerabilities in code. In order to mitigate the risks arising from such vulnerabilities, various techniques have been proposed to isolate the execution of…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-06-12 Ahmad Atamli-Reineh , Andrew Martin

Recent research has demonstrated that Intel's SGX is vulnerable to software-based side-channel attacks. In a common attack, the adversary monitors CPU caches to infer secret-dependent data accesses patterns. Known defenses have major…

Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems. The SSL/TLS protocol, which is the de facto standard for protecting transport-layer…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-09-28 Yuan Xiao , Mengyuan Li , Sanchuan Chen , Yinqian Zhang

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provides a trusted execution environment (TEE) to run code and operate sensitive data. SGX provides runtime hardware protection where both code and data are protected even if other code components are…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2020-06-25 Alexander Nilsson , Pegah Nikbakht Bideh , Joakim Brorsson

In this paper, we explore a new, yet critical, side-channel attack against Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX), called a branch shadowing attack, which can reveal fine-grained control flows (i.e., each branch) of an enclave program running…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-06-05 Sangho Lee , Ming-Wei Shih , Prasun Gera , Taesoo Kim , Hyesoon Kim , Marcus Peinado

Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2026-03-03 Wenhao Wang , Guoxing Chen , Xiaorui Pan , Yinqian Zhang , XiaoFeng Wang , Vincent Bindschaedler , Haixu Tang , Carl A. Gunter

Exceptions are a commodity hardware functionality which is central to multi-tasking OSes as well as event-driven user applications. Normally, the OS assists the user application by lifting the semantics of exceptions received from hardware…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2021-10-14 Jinhua Cui , Jason Zhijingcheng Yu , Shweta Shinde , Prateek Saxena , Zhiping Cai

Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a promising hardware-based technology for protecting sensitive computations from potentially compromised system software. However, recent research has shown that SGX is vulnerable to branch-shadowing…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-10-04 Shohreh Hosseinzadeh , Hans Liljestrand , Ville Leppänen , Andrew Paverd

Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2020-07-17 Tobias Cloosters , Michael Rodler , Lucas Davi

Besides Intel's SGX technology, there are long-running discussions on how trusted computing technologies can be used to cloak malware. Past research showed example methods of malicious activities utilising Flicker, Trusted Platform Module,…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-11-02 Kubilay Ahmet Küçük , Steve Moyle , Andrew Martin , Alexandru Mereacre , Nicholas Allott

Intel(R) Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) is a hardware-based technology for ensuring security of sensitive data from disclosure or modification that enables user-level applications to allocate protected areas of memory called enclaves. Such…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2017-11-01 Rodolfo Silva , Pedro Barbosa , Andrey Brito

We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2021-06-08 Ivan Puddu , Moritz Schneider , Miro Haller , Srdjan Čapkun
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