相关论文: USBee: Air-Gap Covert-Channel via Electromagnetic …
Because computers may contain or interact with sensitive information, they are often air-gapped and in this way kept isolated and disconnected from the Internet. In recent years the ability of malware to communicate over an air-gap by…
In this paper, we show that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers via Wi-Fi signals. Malware in a compromised air-gapped computer can generate signals in the Wi-Fi frequency bands. The signals are generated through the…
Air-gapped systems are physically separated from external networks, including the Internet. This isolation is achieved by keeping the air-gap computers disconnected from wired or wireless networks, preventing direct or remote communication…
Physical isolation from external networks - an airgap - aims to minimize exposure to remote attacks. Yet capable adversaries still achieve code execution on air-gapped systems, and prior work has shown that they can then wirelessly…
Air-gap covert channels are special types of covert communication channels that enable attackers to exfiltrate data from isolated, network-less computers. Various types of air-gap covert channels have been demonstrated over the years,…
Electronic devices and cables inadvertently emit RF emissions as a byproduct of signal processing and/or transmission. Labeled as electromagnetic emanations, they form an EM side-channel for data leakage. Previously, it was believed that…
It is known that attackers can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers through their speakers via sonic and ultrasonic waves. To eliminate the threat of such acoustic covert channels in sensitive systems, audio hardware can be disabled…
Air-gapped computers are disconnected from the Internet physically and logically. This measure is taken in order to prevent the leakage of sensitive data from secured networks. In the past, it has been shown that malware can exfiltrate data…
It is known that malware can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones using ultrasonic waves. However, this covert channel requires access to the smartphone's microphone, which is highly protected in Android OS…
The USB protocol has become a ubiquitous standard for connecting peripherals to computers, making its security a critical concern. A recent research study demonstrated the potential to exploit weaknesses in well-established protocols, such…
In this paper, we show that attackers can leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers to nearby smartphones via covert magnetic signals. The proposed covert channel works even if a smartphone is kept inside a Faraday shielding case, which…
Universal Serial Bus (USB) Flash Drives are nowadays one of the most convenient and diffused means to transfer files, especially when no Internet connection is available. However, USB flash drives are also one of the most common attack…
Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-gapped computer might also be kept secluded in a Faraday…
Air-gapped networks are wired with Ethernet cables since wireless connections are strictly prohibited. In this paper we present LANTENNA - a new type of electromagnetic attack allowing adversaries to leak sensitive data from isolated,…
In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a compromised…
It has been assumed that the physical separation (air-gap) of computers provides a reliable level of security, such that should two adjacent computers become compromised, the covert exchange of data between them would be impossible. In this…
This paper presents our methodology and toolbox that allows analyzing the radio access network security of laboratory and commercial 4G and future 5G cellular networks. We leverage a free open-source software suite that implements the LTE…
Attackers willing to compromise computing systems can use malicious peripherals as an attack vector, threatening users that cannot verify the hardware's authenticity. To address this problem, our work uses the Security Protocol and Data…
USB is the most prevalent peripheral interface in modern computer systems and its inherent insecurities make it an appealing attack vector. A well-known limitation of USB is that traffic is not encrypted. This allows on-path adversaries to…
Covert channel networks are a well-known method for circumventing the security measures organizations put in place to protect their networks from adversarial attacks. This paper introduces a novel method based on bit-rate modulation for…