相关论文: Compositional security and collateral leakage

To ensure programs do not leak private data, we often want to be able to provide formal guarantees ensuring such data is handled correctly. Often, we cannot keep such data secret entirely; instead programmers specify how private data may be…

Quantitative information flow (QIF) is traditionally defined as the expected value of information leakage over all feasible program runs and it fails to identify vulnerable programs where only limited number of runs leak large amount of…

Quantitative information flow analyses measure how much information on secrets is leaked by publicly observable outputs. One area of interest is to quantify and estimate the information leakage of composed systems. Prior work has focused on…

The disastrous vulnerabilities in smart contracts sharply remind us of our ignorance: we do not know how to write code that is secure in composition with malicious code. Information flow control has long been proposed as a way to achieve…

A program is non-interferent if it leaks no secret information to an observable output. However, non-interference is too strict in many practical cases and quantitative information flow (QIF) has been proposed and studied in depth.…

Secure software architecture is increasingly important in a data-driven world. When security is neglected sensitive information might leak through unauthorized access. To mitigate this software architects needs tools and methods to quantify…

Quantitative theories of information flow give us an approach to relax the absolute confidentiality properties that are difficult to satisfy for many practical programs. The classical information-theoretic approaches for sequential…

Memory-safety issues and information leakage are known to be depressingly common. We consider the compositional static detection of these kinds of vulnerabilities in first-order C-like programs. Indeed the latter are relational hyper-safety…

In the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information Flow (QIF), the adversary typically tries to interfere with the system in the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender, on the other hand, typically…

Leakage of confidential information represents a serious security risk. Despite a number of novel, theoretical advances, it has been unclear if and how quantitative approaches to measuring leakage of confidential information could be…

Information flow analysis is a powerful technique for reasoning about the sensitive information exposed by a program during its execution. While past work has proposed information theoretic metrics (e.g., Shannon entropy, min-entropy,…

Quantitative information flow (QIF) is concerned with measuring how much of a secret is leaked to an adversary who observes the result of a computation that uses it. Prior work has shown that QIF techniques based on abstract interpretation…

In the inference attacks studied in Quantitative Information Flow (QIF), the attacker typically tries to interfere with the system in the attempt to increase its leakage of secret information. The defender, on the other hand, typically…

Information flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of information due to correlation between secrets and observables. Since in general such correlation cannot be avoided completely, it is important to quantify the leakage.…

The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic…

We use Hidden Markov Models to motivate a quantitative compositional semantics for noninterference-based security with iteration, including a refinement- or "implements" relation that compares two programs with respect to their information…

We introduce a new perspective into the field of quantitative information flow (QIF) analysis that invites the community to bound the leakage, reported by QIF quantifiers, by a range consistent with the size of a program's secret input…

This thesis addresses the foundational aspects of formal methods for applications in security and in particular in anonymity. More concretely, we develop frameworks for the specification of anonymity properties and propose algorithms for…

Physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms leak information, which makes them vulnerable to so-called side-channel attacks. The problem of secure computation in the presence of leakage is generally known as leakage resilience. In…

A semantic framework for analyzing safe composition of distributed programs is presented. Its applicability is illustrated by a study of program composition when communication is reliable but not necessarily FIFO\@. In this model, special…