相关论文: Very Static Enforcement of Dynamic Policies

This paper investigates a flow- and path-sensitive static information flow analysis. Compared with security type systems with fixed labels, it has been shown that flow-sensitive type systems accept more secure programs. We show that an…

The paper studies dynamic information flow security policies in an automaton-based model. Two semantic interpretations of such policies are developed, both of which generalize the notion of TA-security [van der Meyden ESORICS 2007] for…

Information flow type systems enforce the security property of noninterference by detecting unauthorized data flows at compile-time. However, they require precise type annotations, making them difficult to use in practice as much of the…

Noninterference offers a rigorous end-to-end guarantee for secure propagation of information. However, real-world systems almost always involve security requirements that change during program execution, making noninterference inapplicable.…

Information flow policies are often dynamic; the security concerns of a program will typically change during execution to reflect security-relevant events. A key challenge is how to best specify, and give proper meaning to, such dynamic…

Information flow security is classically formulated in terms of the absence of illegal information flows, with respect to a security setting consisting of a single flow policy that specifies what information flows should be permitted in the…

We present a deductive approach for the analysis of secure information flows with support for fine-grained policies that include declassifications in the form of delimited information release. By explicitly tracking the dependencies of…

A key challenge when statically typing so-called dynamic languages is the ubiquity of value-based overloading, where a given function can dynamically reflect upon and behave according to the types of its arguments. Thus, to establish basic…

Language-based information flow security aims to decide whether an action-observable program can unintentionally leak confidential information if it has the authority to access confidential data. Recent concerns about declassification…

We present a type theory combining both linearity and dependency by stratifying typing rules into a level for logics and a level for programs. The distinction between logics and programs decouples their semantics, allowing the type system…

Many forms of dependence manifest themselves over time, with behavior of variables in dynamical systems as a paradigmatic example. This paper studies temporal dependence in dynamical systems from a logical perspective, by enriching a…

The dependency core calculus (DCC), a simple extension of the computational lambda calculus, captures a common notion of dependency that arises in many programming language settings. This notion of dependency is closely related to the…

The paper considers the complexity of verifying that a finite state system satisfies a number of definitions of information flow security. The systems model considered is one in which agents operate synchronously with awareness of the…

Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed if one can prove that the program does…

Managing stateful resources safely and expressively is a longstanding challenge in programming languages, especially in the presence of aliasing. While scope-based constructs such as Java's synchronized blocks offer ease of reasoning, they…

Information flow properties express the capability for an agent to infer information about secret behaviours of a partially observable system. In a language-theoretic setting, where the system behaviour is described by a language, we define…

Temporal epistemic logic is a well-established framework for expressing agents knowledge and how it evolves over time. Within language-based security these are central issues, for instance in the context of declassification. We propose to…

We propose an approach on model checking information flow for imperative language with procedures. We characterize our model with pushdown system, which has a stack of unbounded length that naturally models the execution of procedural…

We propose a new sheaf semantics for secure information flow over a space of abstract behaviors, based on synthetic domain theory: security classes are open/closed partitions, types are sheaves, and redaction of sensitive information…

Safely integrating third-party code in applications while protecting the confidentiality of information is a long-standing problem. Pure functional programming languages, like Haskell, make it possible to enforce lightweight…