相关论文: Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of prac…

The security proofs of continuous-variable quantum key distribution are based on the assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions may be invalid in practice due…

We analyzed the security of the multiparty quantum secret sharing (MQSS) protocol recently proposed by Zhang, Li and Man [Phys. Rev. A \textbf{71}, 044301 (2005)] and found that this protocol is secure for any other eavesdropper except for…

We explore a new security loophole in a practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CVQKD) system, which is opened by the photorefractive effect of lithium niobate-based (LN-based) modulators. By exploiting this loophole, we…

The phase-coding quantum cryptographic scheme using the homodyne detection and weak coherent state [Hirano et al.,Phys. Rev. A 68, 042331 (2003)] provides the simplest continuous-variable quantum key distribution scheme from the…

In this paper, security of practically decoy state quantum key distribution under fake state attack is considered. If quantum key distribution is insecure under this type of attack, decoy sources can not also provide it with enough…

This paper introduces and demonstrates four new statistical attacks against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme. The attacks utilize compromised random number generators at Alice's/Bob's site(s). The case of…

This is a study of the security of the Coherent One-Way (COW) protocol for quantum cryptography, proposed recently as a simple and fast experimental scheme. In the zero-error regime, the eavesdropper Eve can only take advantage of the…

Here, we investigate the security of the practical one-way CVQKD and CV-MDI-QKD systems under laser seeding attack. In particular, Eve can inject a suitable light into the laser diodes of the light source modules in the two kinds of…

We consider one of the quantum key distribution protocols recently introduced in Ref. [Pirandola et al., Nature Physics 4, 726 (2008)]. This protocol consists in a two-way quantum communication between Alice and Bob, where Alice encodes…

Recently, a "counterfactual" quantum key distribution scheme was proposed by Tae-Gon Noh [1]. In this scheme, two legitimate distant peers may share secret keys even when the information carriers are not traveled in the quantum channel. We…

Known key exchange schemes offering information-theoretic (unconditional) security are complex and costly to implement. Nonetheless, they remain the only known methods for achieving unconditional security in key exchange. Therefore, the…

We obtain estimates for Eve's forgery probability, namely the probability that she is able to forge a message which Alice or Bob mistakenly accept over a noisy Quantum channel for generating a shared Quantum secret key. This probability is…

We analyze realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) arising from the combination of laser damage attack (LDA) and unambiguous state discrimination (USD). While decoy-state QKD is designed to protect against…

We present the wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution system with a heterodyne protocol, in which the transmittance of beam splitters at Bob's station is wavelength-dependent. Our strategy is proposed…

We demonstrate the security vulnerability of the ideal Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key exchanger against transient attacks. Transients start when Alice and Bob connect the wire to their chosen resistor at the beginning of each clock…

Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key…

We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be the…

The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks…

In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully…

Unconditional security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol has been proved by exploiting the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, but the practical quantum key distribution system maybe hacked by considering the imperfect state…