相关论文: An Ordinal Bargaining Solution with Fixed-Point Pr…

We study the finitary satisfiability problem for first order logic with two variables and two binary relations, corresponding to the induced successor relations of two finite linear orders. We show that the problem is decidable in NEXPTIME.

Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…

This paper depicts an algorithm for solving the Decision Boolean Satisfiability Problem using the binary numerical properties of a Special Decision Satisfiability Problem, parallel execution, object oriented, and short termination. The two…

We study a sequential decision-making model where a set of items is repeatedly matched to the same set of agents over multiple rounds. The objective is to determine a sequence of matchings that either maximizes the utility of the least…

When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

Multi-objective unconstrained combinatorial optimization problems (MUCO) are in general hard to solve, i.e., the corresponding decision problem is NP-hard and the outcome set is intractable. In this paper we explore special cases of MUCO…

Bilateral negotiation is a complex, context-sensitive task in which human negotiators dynamically adjust anchors, pacing, and flexibility to exploit power asymmetries and informal cues. We introduce a unified mathematical framework for…

Automated negotiation in complex, multi-party and multi-issue settings critically depends on accurate opponent modeling. However, conventional numerical-only approaches fail to capture the qualitative information embedded in natural…

Evidential cooperation in large worlds (ECL) refers to the idea that humans and other agents can benefit by cooperating with similar agents with differing values in causally disconnected parts of a large universe. Cooperating provides…

In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…

In response to a concern raised by Horty, this paper develops a two-tiered, preference-based semantic framework for modeling defeasible conditional obligations. The paper extends a Hansson-Lewis style preference semantics for dyadic deontic…

Motivated by hiring pipelines, we study three selection and ordering problems in which applicants for a finite set of positions must be interviewed or sent offers. There is a finite time budget for interviewing/sending offers, and every…

We study the bilateral trade problem: one seller, one buyer and a single, indivisible item for sale. It is well known that there is no fully-efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for this problem that maintains a balanced budget. We…

The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…

This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with inf/sup-compact payoff functions and with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and…

Games of ordered preference (GOOPs) model multi-player equilibrium problems in which each player maintains a distinct hierarchy of strictly prioritized objectives. Existing approaches solve GOOPs by deriving and enforcing the necessary…

This paper examines games with strategic complements or substitutes and incomplete information, where players are uncertain about the opponents' parameters. We assume that the players' beliefs about the opponent's parameters are selected…

We study some ergodicity property of zero-sum stochastic games with a finite state space and possibly unbounded payoffs. We formulate this property in operator-theoretical terms, involving the solvability of an optimality equation for the…

Finding, counting, or determining the existence of Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given each others' actions, are known to be computational intractable problems. We ask whether weakening optimality to the requirement…