相关论文: Using Covert Topological Information for Defense A…

We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…

This paper proposes a methodology to identify and protect vulnerable components of connected gas and electric infrastructures from malicious attacks, and to guarantee a resilient operation by deploying valid corrective actions (while…

State estimation is of considerable significance for the power system operation and control. However, well-designed false data injection attacks can utilize blind spots in conventional residual-based bad data detection methods to manipulate…

Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network…

This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…

In large-scale networks, communication links between nodes are easily injected with false data by adversaries. This paper proposes a novel security defense strategy from the perspective of attack detection scheduling to ensure the security…

Data injection attacks (DIAs) pose a significant cybersecurity threat to the Smart Grid by enabling an attacker to compromise the integrity of data acquisition and manipulate estimated states without triggering bad data detection…

Short-term load forecasting is an essential task that supports utilities to schedule generating sufficient power for balancing supply and demand, and can become an attractive target for cyber attacks. It has been shown that the power system…

Data Poisoning (DP) is an effective attack that causes trained classifiers to misclassify their inputs. DP attacks significantly degrade a classifier's accuracy by covertly injecting attack samples into the training set. Broadly applicable…

We consider the problem of false data injection attacks modeled as additive disturbances in various parts of a general LTI feedback system and derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of stealthy unbounded attacks. We…

We consider a scenario in which a DoS attacker with the limited power resource jams a wireless network through which the packet from a sensor is sent to a remote estimator to estimate the system state. To degrade the estimation quality with…

Physical consequences to power systems of false data injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack…

The resilience of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for electric power networks for certain cyber-attacks is considered. We analyze the vulnerability of the measurement system to false data attack on communicated…

We study moving-target defense (MTD) that actively perturbs transmission line reactances to thwart stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in a power grid. Prior work on this topic has proposed MTD based on…

An unobservable false data injection (FDI) attack on AC state estimation (SE) is introduced and its consequences on the physical system are studied. With a focus on understanding the physical consequences of FDI attacks, a bi-level…

False data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on power systems can be prevented by strategically selecting and protecting a sufficiently large measurement subset, which, however, requires adequate cyber-defense resources for measurement…

This paper quantifies the security of uncertain interconnected systems under stealthy data injection attacks. In particular, we consider a large-scale system composed of a certain subsystem interconnected with an uncertain subsystem, where…

In this paper, the impact of false information injection is investigated for linear dynamic systems with multiple sensors. It is assumed that the system is unsuspecting the existence of false information and the adversary is trying to…

The false data injection (FDI) attack cannot be detected by the traditional anomaly detection techniques used in the energy system state estimators. In this paper, we demonstrate how FDI attacks can be constructed blindly, i.e., without…

Tomography inference attacks aim to reconstruct network topology by analyzing end-to-end probe delays. Existing defenses mitigate these attacks by manipulating probe delays to mislead inference, but rely on two strong assumptions: (i) probe…