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相关论文: Generalized Second Price Auction with Probabilisti…

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Sponsored search adopts generalized second price (GSP) auction mechanism which works on the concept of pay per click which is most commonly used for the allocation of slots in the searched page. Two main aspects associated with GSP are the…

信息检索 · 计算机科学 2014-03-26 Rahul Gupta , Gitansh Khirbat , Sanjay Singh

Spectrum auction is an effective approach to improving spectrum utilization, by leasing idle spectrum from primary users to secondary users. Recently, a few differentially private spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed, but, as far…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2018-10-19 Zhili Chen , Tianjiao Ni , Hong Zhong , Shun Zhang , Jie Cui

As commerce shifts to digital marketplaces, platforms increasingly monetize traffic through Sponsored Shopping auctions. Unlike classic ``Sponsored Search", where an advertiser typically bids for a single link, these settings involve…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-02-27 Paul Dütting , Yuhao Li , Renato Paes Leme , Kelly Spendlove , Yifeng Teng

We propose an auction for online advertising where each ad occupies either one square or two horizontally-adjacent squares of a grid of squares. Our primary application are ads for products shown on retail websites such as Instacart or…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-07-12 Jonathan Gu , David Pal , Kevin Ryan

In programmatic advertising, ad slots are usually sold using second-price (SP) auctions in real-time. The highest bidding advertiser wins but pays only the second-highest bid (known as the winning price). In SP, for a single item, the…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2020-01-22 Aritra Ghosh , Saayan Mitra , Somdeb Sarkhel , Jason Xie , Gang Wu , Viswanathan Swaminathan

Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-07-29 Xiang Shao , Wei Wang , Guan Gui

A diffusion auction refers to a selling process conducted over a social network, where each participant submits a bid and may invite other potential buyers to join the auction. Although various mechanisms have been proposed, none of them…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2026-05-19 Xinlun Zhang , Zhechen Li , Yongzhi Cao , Yu Huang , Hanpin Wang

Digital advertising platforms and publishers sell ad inventory that conveys targeting information, such as demographic, contextual, or behavioral audience segments, to advertisers. While revealing this information improves ad relevance, it…

综合经济学 · 经济学 2026-01-15 Srinivas Tunuguntla , Carl F. Mela , Jason Pratt

In this work, we study spectrum auction problem where each request from secondary users has spatial, temporal, and spectral features. With the requests of secondary users and the reserve price of the primary user, our goal is to design…

网络与互联网体系结构 · 计算机科学 2013-05-29 Yu-e Sun , He Huang , Xiang-Yang Li , Zhili Chen , Wei Yang , Hongli Xu , Liusheng Huang

In the Bidder Selection Problem (BSP) there is a large pool of $n$ potential advertisers competing for ad slots on the user's web page. Due to strict computational restrictions, the advertising platform can run a proper auction only for a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-04-30 Nickolai Gravin , Yixuan Even Xu , Renfei Zhou

In a sponsored search auction the advertisement slots on a search result page are generally ordered by click-through rate. Bidders have a valuation, which is usually assumed to be linear in the click-through rate, a budget constraint, and…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2011-12-30 Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi , Monika Henzinger , Stefano Leonardi , Martin Starnberger

This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP),…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-05-02 Peyman Khezr , Vijay Mohan , Lionel Page

Many spectrum auction mechanisms have been proposed for spectrum allocation problem, and unfortunately, few of them protect the bid privacy of bidders and achieve good social efficiency. In this paper, we propose PPS, a Privacy Preserving…

网络与互联网体系结构 · 计算机科学 2013-08-30 He Huang , Xiang-Yang Li , Yu-e Sun , Hongli Xu , Liusheng Huang

Over the last decade, digital media (web or app publishers) generalized the use of real time ad auctions to sell their ad spaces. Multiple auction platforms, also called Supply-Side Platforms (SSP), were created. Because of this…

Developing efficient sequential bidding strategies for repeated auctions is an important practical challenge in various marketing tasks. In this setting, the bidding agent obtains information, on both the value of the item at sale and the…

机器学习 · 计算机科学 2021-03-01 Juliette Achddou , Olivier Cappé , Aurélien Garivier

We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing {\em sequential posted-pricing mechanisms (SPM)} in $K$-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has $K$ copies of an item to sell, and there are $n$ buyers,…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2010-08-11 Tanmoy Chakraborty , Eyal Even-Dar , Sudipto Guha , Yishay Mansour , S. Muthukrishnan

This paper studies equilibrium quality of semi-separable position auctions (known as the Ad Types setting) with greedy or optimal allocation combined with generalized second-price (GSP) or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing. We make three…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2021-03-11 Hadi Elzayn , Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi , Brian Lan , Okke Schrijvers

Since 2019, most ad exchanges and sell-side platforms (SSPs), in the online advertising industry, shifted from second to first price auctions. Due to the fundamental difference between these auctions, demand-side platforms (DSPs) have had…

Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. While there has been a lot of attention on the auction process and its game-theoretic aspects, our focus is on the advertisers. In particular,…

数据结构与算法 · 计算机科学 2007-05-23 Jon Feldman , S. Muthukrishnan , Martin Pal , Cliff Stein

We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…

理论经济学 · 经济学 2022-02-16 Ethan Che