相关论文: Designing Informative Securities

Suppliers (including companies and individual prosumers) may wish to protect their private information when selling items they have in stock. A market is envisaged where private information can be protected through the use of differential…

A monopolist seller of multiple goods screens a buyer whose type is initially unknown to both but drawn from a commonly known distribution. The buyer privately learns about his type via a signal. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism in…

Prediction markets provide an efficient means to assess uncertain quantities from forecasters. Traditional and competitive strictly proper scoring rules have been shown to incentivize players to provide truthful probabilistic forecasts.…

I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal…

We study optimal information provision in transportation networks when users are strategic and the network state is uncertain. An omniscient planner observes the network state and discloses information to the users with the goal of…

Strategic information design is a framework where a sender designs information strategically to steer its receiver's decision towards a desired choice. Traditionally, such frameworks have always assumed that the sender and the receiver…

We introduce a framework where the announcements of a clearinghouse about the allocation process are opaque in the sense that there can be more than one outcome compatible with a realization of type reports. We ask whether desirable…

Prediction markets are widely treated as forecasting devices that reveal collective expectations about uncertain futures. This article argues that under specifiable conditions they also function as coordination mechanisms: public…

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

Platforms critically rely on rating systems to learn the quality of market participants. In practice, however, these ratings are often highly inflated, and therefore not very informative. In this paper, we first investigate whether the…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…

Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner can only directly reach a small number of participants (her…

In speculative markets, risk-free profit opportunities are eliminated by traders exploiting them. Markets are therefore often described as "informationally efficient", rapidly removing predictable price changes, and leaving only residual…

A common assumption in financial engineering is that the market price for any derivative coincides with an objectively defined risk-neutral price - a plausible assumption only if traders collectively possess objective knowledge about the…

This study is a preliminary exploration of the concept of informativeness -how much information a sentence gives about a word it contains- and its potential benefits to building quality word representations from scarce data. We propose…

We study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents. In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when the number of traders with different private information is large enough.…

This work introduces a framework for quantifying the information content of logical propositions through the use of implication hypergraphs. We posit that a proposition's informativeness is primarily determined by its relationships with…

This paper introduces a transparent framework to identify the informational content of FOMC announcements. We do so by modelling the expectations of the FOMC and private sector agents using state of the art computational linguistic tools on…

Distilling data into compact and interpretable analytic equations is one of the goals of science. Instead, contemporary supervised machine learning methods mostly produce unstructured and dense maps from input to output. Particularly in…

Developing a system of indicators that reflects the degree to which the securities market fulfils its key functions, is essential to assess the level of its development. In the conditions of asymmetric information it can also provide…