相关论文: A power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge Com…
Primary law of the European Union demands that the allocation of the seats of the European Parliament between the Member States must obey the principle of degressive proportionality. The principle embodies the political aim that the more…
Seven mathematicians and one political scientist met at the Cambridge Apportionment Meeting in January 2011. They agreed a unanimous recommendation to the European Parliament for its future apportionments between the EU Member States. This…
In recent years, enlargement of the European Union has brought with it renewed discussion of voting arrangements in the Council of the EU. During these negotiations, the Polish government proposed a voting scheme that gives each country a…
Distribution of seats in The European Parliament postulated by Treaty of Lisbon should be degressively proportional. The meaning of degressively proportional concept can be found in two principles annexed to the draft of European Parliament…
The following paper is part of the authors' response to an invitation from the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) of the European Parliament to advise on mathematical methods for the allocation of Parliamentary seats between the 27…
The notion of the voting power is illustrated by examples of the systems of voting in the European Council according to the Treaty of Nice and the more recent proposition of the European Convent. We show that both systems are not…
The Council of the European Union (EU) is one of the main decision-making bodies of the EU. A number of decisions require a qualified majority, the support of 55% of the member states (currently 15) that represent at least 65% of the total…
In recent years, enlargement of the European Union has led to increased interest in the allocation of voting weights to member states with hugely differing population numbers. While the eventually agreed voting scheme lacks any strict…
The division of mandates to the European Parliament posed difficulties since the beginning of its operation. Introduction of the degressive proportionality principle to legal acts intensified further discussion on this subject. The…
We consider three algorithms for allocating parliamentary seats by proportional representation. The usual approach to describing such algorithms is to compute a quota of votes that each party uses to "acquire'' representatives. This kind of…
An important question in representative democracies is how to determine the optimal parliament size of a given country. According to an old conjecture, known as the cubic root law, there is a fairly universal power-law relation, with an…
The problem of designing an optimal weighted voting system for the two-tier voting, applicable in the case of the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU), is investigated. Various arguments in favour of the square root voting…
In parliamentary elections, parties compete for a limited, typically fixed number of seats. Most parliaments are assembled using apportionment methods that distribute the seats based on the parties' vote counts. Common apportionment methods…
In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to…
We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…
In certain bodies, like the Council of the EU, the member states have a voting weight which depends on the population of the re- spective state. In this article we ask the question which voting weight guarantees a `fair' representation of…
Systems of indirect voting based on the principle of qualified majority can be analysed using the methods of game theory. In particular, this applies to the voting system in the Council of the European Union, which was recently a subject of…
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of alternatives in analogous fashion. We compare the effect of…
We compare different actual forms of democracy and analyse in which way they are variations of a 'natural consensus decision process'. We analyse how 'consensus decision followed by majority voting' is open to 'false play' by the majority,…
We investigate the voting rules in the Council of the European Union. It is known that the current system, according to the Treaty of Nice, and the voting system proposed in the Lisbon treaty both strongly deviate from the square root law…