相关论文: Agent Based Trust Management Model Based on Weight…

In the private values single object auction model, we construct a satisfactory mechanism - a symmetric, dominant strategy incentive compatible, and budget-balanced mechanism. Our mechanism allocates the object to the highest valued agent…

In mechanism design, it is challenging to design the optimal auction with correlated values in general settings. Although value distribution can be further exploited to improve revenue, the complex correlation structure makes it hard to…

Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possibly erroneous) machine-learned prediction that they can use…

We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit…

All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…

We provide the first direct test of how the credibility of an auction format affects bidding behavior and final outcomes. To do so, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments where the role of the seller is played by a human subject who…

In this study, we developed a computational framework for simulating large-scale agent-based financial markets. Our platform supports trading multiple simultaneous assets and leverages distributed computing to scale the number and…

Designing a financial market that works well is very important for developing and maintaining an advanced economy, but is not easy because changing detailed rules, even ones that seem trivial, sometimes causes unexpected large impacts and…

From social networks to supply chains, more and more aspects of how humans, firms and organizations interact is mediated by artificial learning agents. As the influence of machine learning systems grows, it is paramount that we study how to…

In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory and leads to different strategies and outcomes. We refer to…

Relational query optimisers rely on cost models to choose between different query execution plans. Selectivity estimates are known to be a crucial input to the cost model. In practice, standard selectivity estimation procedures are prone to…

The success of an agent mediated e-market system lies in the underlying reputation management system to improve the quality of services in an information asymmetric e-market. Reputation provides an operatable metric for establishing…

This paper explores the utility of agent-based simulations in realistically modelling market structures and sheds light on the nuances of optimal dealer strategies. It underscores the contrast between conclusions drawn from probabilistic…

This manuscript presents an alternative implementation of the truthful-in-expectation mechanism of Dughmi, Roughgarden and Yan for combinatorial auctions with weighted-matroid-rank-sum valuations. The new implementation uses only value…

Trust is a crucial component in collaborative multiagent systems (MAS) involving humans and autonomous AI agents. Rather than assuming trust based on past system behaviours, it is important to formally verify trust by modelling the current…

Indirect competition emerged from the complex organization of human societies, and knowledge of the existing network topology may aid in developing effective strategies for success. Here, we propose an agent-based model of competition with…

We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…

We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…

Most previous works on opinion modeling lack the simultaneous study of individual mental activity and group behavior. This paper is motivated to propose an agent-based online opinion formation model based on attitude change theory, group…

We provide efficient estimation methods for first- and second-price auctions under independent (asymmetric) private values and partial observability. Given a finite set of observations, each comprising the identity of the winner and the…