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It was claimed that all quantum string seals are insecure [H. F. Chau, quant-ph/0602099]. However, here it will be shown that for imperfect quantum string seals, the information obtained by the measurement proposed in that reference is…
Recently an attack strategy was proposed by Chau [H. F. Chau, quant-ph/0602099 v3], which was claimed to be able to break all quantum string seal protocols, including the one proposed by He [G. P. He, Int. J. Quant. Inform. 4, 677 (2006)].…
A quantum string seal encodes the value of a (bit) string as a quantum state in such a way that everyone can extract a non-negligible amount of available information on the string by a suitable measurement. Moreover, such measurement must…
Quantum bit seal is a way to encode a classical bit quantum mechanically so that everyone can obtain non-zero information on the value of the bit. Moreover, such an attempt should have a high chance of being detected by an authorized…
Sealing information means making it publicly available, but with the possibility of knowing if it has been read. Commenting on [1], we will show that perfect quantum sealing is not possible for perfectly retrievable information, due to the…
An author (arXiv:1709.09262 [quant-ph] (2017), Nanoscale Research Letters (2017) 12:552) has recently questioned the security of two-way quantum key distribution schemes by referring to attack strategies which leave no errors in the (raw)…
A quantum seal is a way of encoding a message into quantum states, so that anybody may read the message with little error, while authorized verifiers can detect that the seal has been broken. We present a simple extension to the…
Though it was proven that secure quantum sealing of a single classical bit is impossible in principle, here we propose an unconditionally secure quantum sealing protocol which seals a classical bit string. Any reader can obtain each bit of…
In a recent paper [A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. A 61, 052312 (2000)], a quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping was proposed. However, in this comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure if Eve use a special…
Recently, Zhang, Li, and Guo have proposed a particular eavesdropping attack [Phys. Rev. A {\bf 63}, 036301 (2001), quant-ph/0009042] which shows that my quantum key distribution protocol based on entanglement swapping [Phys. Rev. A {\bf…
In a recent comment \cite{ch1} it has been claimed that an entangled-based quantum key distribution protocol proposed in \cite{zhang} and its generalization to d-level systems in \cite{v1} are insecure against an attack devised by the…
Analyzing carefully an experimentally feasible non-entangled single qubit quantum secret sharing protocol and its modified version [Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 230505 (2005); ibid. 98, 028902 (2007)], it is found that both versions are insecure…
Rigorous mathematical proofs of the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV QKD) have been obtained recently. Unfortunately, these security proofs rely on assumptions that are hardly met in experimental practice. Here I…
In the paper [Phys. Rev. A 65, 052331(2002)], an entanglement-based quantum key distribution protocol for d-level systems was proposed. However, in this Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure for a special attack strategy.
A simple counter-example is given on the prevalent interpretation of the trace distance criterion as failure probability in quantum key distribution protocols. A summary of its ramifications is listed.
We find that the generally accepted security criteria are flawed for a whole class of protocols for quantum cryptography. This is so because a standard assumption of the security analysis, namely that the so-called square-root measurement…
Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks, if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity of quantum theory to prove the security…
A prevalent issue in practical applications of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the emergence of correlations among the emitted signals. Although recent works have proved the security of QKD in the presence of this imperfection, they rest…
The physical layer describes how communication signals are encoded and transmitted across a channel. Physical security often requires either restricting access to the channel or performing periodic manual inspections. In this tutorial, we…
It is shown that Smolin four-qubit bound entangled states [Phys. Rev. A, 63 032306 (2001)] can maximally violate two-setting Bell inequality similar to standard CHSH inequality. Surprisingly this entanglement does not allow for secure key…