相关论文: Sequential mechanism design

To address the exponentially increasing data rate demands of end users, necessitates efficient spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum bands to cater to the temporal and spatial variations of…

This work deals with the implementation of social choice rules using dominant strategies for unrestricted preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that only few unappealing social choice rules can be implemented unless…

In this paper, we design and develop a pricing model applicable to strategy proof pricing. To provide an economic stability towards its consumers. The economic model we use is Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). By this each service provider has…

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a…

Concurrent pattern calculus (CPC) drives interaction between processes by comparing data structures, just as sequential pattern calculus drives computation. By generalising from pattern matching to pattern unification, interaction becomes…

Due to its theoretical virtues, several recent works propose the use of the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for electricity markets. Coalitions of participants, however, can influence the VCG outcome to obtain…

Truthfulness is fragile and demanding. It is oftentimes computationally harder than solving the original problem. Even worse, truthfulness can be utterly destroyed by small uncertainties in a mechanism's outcome. One obstacle is that…

We study a sequential mechanism design problem in which a principal seeks to elicit truthful reports from multiple rational agents while starting with no prior knowledge of agents' beliefs. We introduce Distributionally Robust Adaptive…

In mechanism design, the gold standard solution concepts are dominant strategy incentive compatibility and Bayesian incentive compatibility. These solution concepts relieve the (possibly unsophisticated) bidders from the need to engage in…

Based on the principles of importance sampling and resampling, sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) encompasses a large set of powerful techniques dealing with complex stochastic dynamic systems. Many of these systems possess strong memory, with…

In this work we deploy a mechanism design approach for allocating a divisible commodity (electricity in our example) among consumers. We consider each consumer with an associated personal valuation function of the energy resource during a…

We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer…

To address the demand of exponentially increasing end users efficient use of limited spectrum is a necessity. For this, spectrum allocation among co-existing operators in licensed and unlicensed spectrum band is required to cater to the…

The sequent calculus is a formalism for proving validity of statements formulated in First-Order Logic. It is routinely used in computer science modules on mathematical logic. Formal proofs in the sequent calculus are finite trees obtained…

Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market…

We introduce the use of reinforcement learning for indirect mechanisms, working with the existing class of sequential price mechanisms, which generalizes both serial dictatorship and posted price mechanisms and essentially characterizes all…

We propose a physics-grounded mechanism design for dynamic spectrum sharing that bridges the gap between radiometric retrieval constraints and economic incentives. We formulate the active and passive users coexistence problem as a…

Generative Knowledge Graph Construction (KGC) refers to those methods that leverage the sequence-to-sequence framework for building knowledge graphs, which is flexible and can be adapted to widespread tasks. In this study, we summarize the…

We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both positive and negative values. We show that the class of…

A control model of the production of VCV sequences is presented, which consists in three main parts: a static forward model of the relations between motor commands and acoustic properties; the specification of targets in the perceptual…