相关论文: Quantum Auctions
In this paper, we investigate properties of some multi-particle entangled states and, from the properties applying the secret sharing present a new type of quantum key distribution protocols as generalization of quantum key distribution…
Traditional auction theory posits that bid value exhibits a positive correlation with the probability of securing the auctioned object in ascending auctions. However, under uncertainty and incomplete information, as is characteristic in…
A key challenge in combinatorial auctions is designing bid formats that accurately capture agents' preferences while remaining computationally feasible. This is especially true for electricity auctions, where complex preferences complicate…
Quantum methods allow to reduce communication complexity of some computational tasks, with several separated partners, beyond classical constraints. Nevertheless, experimental demonstrations of this fact are thus far limited to some…
Online auctions play a central role in online advertising, and are one of the main reasons for the industry's scalability and growth. With great changes in how auctions are being organized, such as changing the second- to first-price…
We study two standard multi-unit auction formats for allocating multiple units of a single good to multi-demand bidders. The first one is the Discriminatory Auction, which charges every winner his winning bids. The second is the Uniform…
We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that such repeated games -- by virtue of inherent quantum-mechanical…
Signaling is an important topic in the study of asymmetric information in economic settings. In particular, the transparency of information available to a seller in an auction setting is a question of major interest. We introduce the study…
Overcoming the influence of noise and imperfections in quantum devices is one of the main challenges for viable quantum applications. In this article, we present different protocols, which we denote as "superposed quantum error mitigation",…
We address online learning in complex auction settings, such as sponsored search auctions, where the value of the bidder is unknown to her, evolving in an arbitrary manner and observed only if the bidder wins an allocation. We leverage the…
Modern ad auctions allow advertisers to target more specific segments of the user population. Unfortunately, this is not always in the best interest of the ad platform. In this paper, we examine the following basic question in the context…
Sponsored search positions are typically allocated through real-time auctions, where the outcomes depend on advertisers' quality-adjusted bids - the product of their bids and quality scores. Although quality scoring helps promote ads with…
We study combinatorial auctions with bidders that exhibit endowment effect. In most of the previous work on cognitive biases in algorithmic game theory (e.g., [Kleinberg and Oren, EC'14] and its follow-ups) the focus was on analyzing the…
All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
This paper analyzes individually-rational ex post equilibrium in the VC (Vickrey-Clarke) combinatorial auctions. If $\Sigma$ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids…
The use of e-Auction services has been increasing in recent years. Security requirements in conducting e-Auctions are mainly bid privacy, anonymity and public verifiability. Most of the secure protocols concentrate on privacy and anonymity,…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…
In this paper, we study online double auctions, where multiple sellers and multiple buyers arrive and depart dynamically to exchange one commodity. We show that there is no deterministic online double auction that is truthful and…
In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agree on the relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bid that is interpreted in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice in…