理论经济学
In our context-free model of a commons, the function$\mathcal{W}$ transforms the profile of the agents' types $(x_{1},..,x_{n})$ to a freely transferable output $\mathcal{W}(x_{1},..,x_{n})$ that they must share fairly. We expand the…
A principal hires an agent to work on a long-term project that culminates in a breakthrough or a breakdown. At each time, the agent privately chooses to work or shirk. Working increases the arrival rate of breakthroughs and decreases the…
In this short note, I show that in a McCall (1970) model with risk-neutral agents, a system of wage insurance combined with unemployment insurance financed by a lump-sum tax on the employed can be replicated -- in the ex ante sense -- by a…
We study the robustness of Bayesian persuasion to uncertainty about the receiver's preferences. We analyze two conceptually distinct notions: continuity, in which only the modeler lacks precise knowledge, but where the model's predictions…
I provide a unified framework to establish the existence of a weak Pareto efficient, envy-free allocation in general settings: random allocations are probability measures on a compact metric space, and preferences of agents are represented…
This paper introduces the Dual-System Thinking (DST) model, a decision-theoretic framework that integrates psychological dual-process theories into economic modeling. A single cognitive weight parameter governs the relative influence of the…
The classic concept of "calibrated forecasts" and its more recent refinement, "calibeating," are defined with respect to the standard quadratic scoring rule. We extend these notions to the class of $\textit{proper}$ scoring rules (for which…
In many choice settings the decision maker (DM) adopts a criterion which is a mediation between her preference, and its opposite. According to such compromise, the first i alternatives on top of the DM's taste are moved, in reverse order,…
We propose and axiomatize preferences on a product state space in light of uncertainty regarding the dependency of different payoff-relevant factors. Dependence structures allow to decompose probabilities and allow to pin down behavior…
We characterize the outcomes of a canonical deterministic model for the intergenerational transmission of capital that features differential fertility. A fertility function determines the relationship between parental capital and the number…
We study the problem of allocating a finite estate among agents whose total claims exceed the available resources, a standard framework in the theory of claims problems. Two canonical rules embody competing fairness ideals: the Proportional…
We study a tractable two-player contest built on a truncated cubic contest success function. Its defining feature is a strategic-feedback parameter whose sign determines whether a leading player's effort lowers (suppression) or raises…
This paper introduces state-robust equilibrium (SRE), a local validity test for Nash predictions in finite-strategy population games when the payoff-relevant aggregate state may be misspecified. The reported prescription and payoff map are…
We study stochastic object assignment problems in which objects may have minimum and maximum requirements, such as with classes with upper and lower enrollment bounds. We construct a new random assignment mechanism, the minimums…
Contract theory typically assumes full commitment by the principal, but many contracts fix some payoff-relevant decisions while leaving others discretionary. We ask when imperfect commitment is equivalent to full commitment. For contracts…
Teams frequently compete on multiple fronts: political parties contest districts for majority control, contractors field specialized units to win procurement contracts, and squads play match by match for titles. Although the prize accrues…
Parties in spatial competition rarely choose platforms that reverse their ideological order. Mutual leapfrogging is the strongest form of reversal: each party locates beyond the other party's ideal point. In voting models without abstention…
Strategic communication often relies on anchors observed by the sender but not by the receiver. An analyst may report against a proprietary valuation model, an auditor against an internal score, a manager against an accounting estimate, or…
I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility and aggregate supply constraints. I…
Public delay can be informative when the existence, custodian, and review dates of hard evidence are observed. I study a disclosure protocol in which a sealed record is docketed, held by a public custodian, and revealed only at terminal…