Imperfect bit-and-basis encoders compromise the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems via modulation flaws, side channels and inter-pulse correlations, which invalidate standard security proofs. Existing results addressing such imperfections suffer from critical limitations: they either consider only specific flaws, offer an unreasonably poor performance, or require the protocol to be run very slowly. Here, we present a finite-key security proof approach against coherent attacks that incorporates general bit-and-basis encoding imperfections (including modulation flaws, side channels and inter-pulse correlations) while achieving significantly better performances than previous approaches and requiring only partial characterization.
@article{arxiv.2305.05930,
title = {Security framework for quantum key distribution with imperfect sources},
author = {Guillermo Currás-Lorenzo and Margarida Pereira and Go Kato and Marcos Curty and Kiyoshi Tamaki},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.05930},
year = {2026}
}
Comments
Main text: 10 pages, 3 figures. Supp info: 63 pages, 12 figures. v2: Added many improvements and extensions to the security proof. v3: Changed title and extended the proof to sources emitting mixed states. v4: Updated to Accepted Manuscript in Optica Quantum. v5: Corrected title to match Accepted Manuscript