Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises provably secure communications. In order to improve the secret key rate, combining a biased basis choice with the decoy-state method is proposed. Concomitantly, there is a basis-independent detection efficiency condition, which usually cannot be satisfied in a practical system, such as the time-phase encoding. Fortunately, this flaw has been recently removed theoretically and experimentally using the fact that the expected yields of single-photon states prepared in two bases stay the same for a given measurement basis. However, the security proofs do not fully consider the finite-key effects for general attacks. In this work, we provide the rigorous finite-key security bounds for four-intensity decoy-state BB84 QKD against coherent attacks in the universally composable framework. Furthermore, we build a time-phase encoding system with 200 MHz clocked to implement this protocol, in which the real-time secret key rate is more than 60 kbps over 50 km single-mode fiber.
@article{arxiv.2002.10668,
title = {Experimental composable security decoy-state quantum key distribution using time-phase encoding},
author = {Hua-Lei Yin and Peng Liu and Wei-Wei Dai and Zhao-Hui Ci and Jie Gu and Tian Gao and Qiang-Wei Wang and Zi-Yao Shen},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.10668},
year = {2021}
}