Random Serial Dictatorship with Transfers
Computer Science and Game Theory
2023-12-14 v1 Theoretical Economics
Abstract
It is well known that Random Serial Dictatorship is strategy-proof and leads to a Pareto-Efficient outcome. We show that this result breaks down when individuals are allowed to make transfers, and adapt Random Serial Dictatorship to encompass trades between individuals. Strategic analysis of play under the new mechanisms we define is given, accompanied by simulations to quantify the gains from trade.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2312.07999,
title = {Random Serial Dictatorship with Transfers},
author = {Sudharsan Sundar and Eric Gao and Trevor Chow and Matthew Ding},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.07999},
year = {2023}
}