Parametrized Algorithms for Random Serial Dictatorship
Computer Science and Game Theory
2014-08-05 v3
Abstract
Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. Recently, it was shown that computing the resulting probabilities is #P-complete both in the voting and assignment setting. In this paper, we study RSD from a parametrized complexity perspective. More specifically, we present efficient algorithms to compute the RSD probabilities under the condition that the number of agent types, alternatives, or objects is bounded.
Cite
@article{arxiv.1403.0974,
title = {Parametrized Algorithms for Random Serial Dictatorship},
author = {Haris Aziz and Julián Mestre},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1403.0974},
year = {2014}
}