Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice
Theoretical Economics
2022-08-22 v3 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems where agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We explore the structure of preference profiles where ex-ante and ex-post efficiency coincide, offer a unifying perspective on the known results, and give several new characterizations. The results have implications for well-studied mechanisms including random serial dictatorship and a number of specific environments, including the dichotomous, single-peaked, and social choice domains.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2203.06353,
title = {Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice},
author = {Federico Echenique and Joseph Root and Fedor Sandomirskiy},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.06353},
year = {2022}
}