Protocol insecurity with finitely many sessions and XOR
Logic in Computer Science
2025-07-01 v1 Cryptography and Security
Abstract
We present a different proof of the insecurity problem for XOR, solved in by Chevalier, Kuesters, Rusinowitch and Turuani (2005). Our proof uses the notion of typed terms and well-typed proofs, and removes a restriction on the class of protocols to which the [CKRT05] proof applies, by introducing a slightly different (but very natural) notion of protocols, where honest agent sends are derivable from previous receives in the same session.
Cite
@article{arxiv.2506.24072,
title = {Protocol insecurity with finitely many sessions and XOR},
author = {R Ramanujam and Vaishnavi Sundararajan and S P Suresh},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2506.24072},
year = {2025}
}