Information-theoretic security without an honest majority
Cryptography and Security
2016-01-06 v1
Abstract
We present six multiparty protocols with information-theoretic security that tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants. All protocols assume pairwise authentic private channels and a broadcast channel (in a single case, we require a simultaneous broadcast channel). We give protocols for veto, vote, anonymous bit transmission, collision detection, notification and anonymous message transmission. Not assuming an honest majority, in most cases, a single corrupt participant can make the protocol abort. All protocols achieve functionality never obtained before without the use of either computational assumptions or of an honest majority.
Cite
@article{arxiv.0706.2010,
title = {Information-theoretic security without an honest majority},
author = {Anne Broadbent and Alain Tapp},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:0706.2010},
year = {2016}
}