Bitcoin Security under Temporary Dishonest Majority
Cryptography and Security
2019-08-02 v1
Abstract
We prove Bitcoin is secure under temporary dishonest majority. We assume the adversary can corrupt a specific fraction of parties and also introduce crash failures, i.e., some honest participants are offline during the execution of the protocol. We demand a majority of honest online participants on expectation. We explore three different models and present the requirements for proving Bitcoin's security in all of them: we first examine a synchronous model, then extend to a bounded delay model and last we consider a synchronous model that allows message losses.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1908.00427,
title = {Bitcoin Security under Temporary Dishonest Majority},
author = {Georgia Avarikioti and Lukas Kaeppeli and Yuyi Wang and Roger Wattenhofer},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.00427},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
In Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2019