Related papers: Protocol insecurity with finitely many sessions an…
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch & Turuani (2003) show that, when…
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch and Turuani (2003) show that, when…
The design and verification of cryptographic protocols is a notoriously difficult task, even in symbolic models which take an abstract view of cryptography. This is mainly due to the fact that protocols may interact with an arbitrary…
We propose an efficient protocol for secure comparison of integers when both integers are shared between two parties. Such protocols are useful for implementing secure auctions. The proposed protocol's computational complexity is roughly…
In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic protocol analysis, cryptographic protocols and (Dolev-Yao) intruders are modeled by Horn theories and security analysis boils down to solving the derivation problem for Horn theories. This…
Quantum conference is a process of securely exchanging messages between three or more parties, using quantum resources. A Measurement Device Independent Quantum Dialogue (MDI-QD) protocol, which is secure against information leakage, has…
We prove a tight parallel repetition theorem for $3$-message computationally-secure quantum interactive protocols between an efficient challenger and an efficient adversary. We also prove under plausible assumptions that the security of…
Except for the traditional threat that candidates may want to cheat, exams have historically not been seen as a serious security problem. That threat is routinely thwarted by having invigilators ensure that candidates do not misbehave…
Type-flaw attacks and multi-protocol attacks on security protocols have been frequently reported in the literature. Heather et al. and Guttman et al. have proven that these could be prevented by tagging encrypted components with distinct…
Recently, a quantum multi-party summation protocol based on the quantum Fourier transform has been proposed [Quantum Inf Process 17: 129, 2018]. The protocol claims to be secure against both outside and participant attacks. However, a…
In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…
A paper presented at the ICICS 2019 conference describes what is claimed to be a `provably secure group authentication [protocol] in the asynchronous communication model'. We show here that this is far from being the case, as the protocol…
Multi-protocol attacks due to protocol interaction has been a notorious problem for security. Gutman-Thayer proved that they can be prevented by ensuring that encrypted messages are distinguishable across protocols, under a free algebra. In…
A system of session types is introduced as induced by a Curry Howard correspondence applied to Bounded Linear Logic, and then extending the thus obtained type system with probabilistic choices and ground types. The obtained system satisfies…
Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…
We consider repeated communication sessions between a RFID Tag (e.g., Radio Frequency Identification, RFID Tag) and a RFID Verifier. A proactive information theoretic security scheme is proposed. The scheme is based on the assumption that…
We define a problem of certifying computation integrity performed by some remote party we do not necessarily trust. We present a multi-party interactive protocol called SafeComp that solves this problem under specified constraints.…
We present six multiparty protocols with information-theoretic security that tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants. All protocols assume pairwise authentic private channels and a broadcast channel (in a single case, we…
Information-theoretic key agreement is impossible to achieve from scratch and must be based on some - ultimately physical - premise. In 2005, Barrett, Hardy, and Kent showed that unconditional security can be obtained in principle based on…
A proof of the security of the Bitcoin protocol is made rigorous, and simplified in certain parts. A computational model in which an adversary can delay transmission of blocks by time $\Delta$ is considered. The protocol is generalized to…