Many quantum key distribution systems employ a laser followed by an optical attenuator to prepare weak coherent states in the source. Their mean photon number must be pre-calibrated to guarantee the security of key distribution. Here we experimentally show that this calibration can be broken with a high-power laser attack. We have tested four fiber-optic attenuator types used in quantum key distribution systems, and found that two of them exhibit a permanent decrease in attenuation after laser damage. This results in higher mean photon numbers in the prepared states and may allow an eavesdropper to compromise the key.
@article{arxiv.1905.10795,
title = {Laser damage attack against optical attenuators in quantum key distribution},
author = {Anqi Huang and Ruoping Li and Vladimir Egorov and Serguei Tchouragoulov and Krtin Kumar and Vadim Makarov},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.10795},
year = {2020}
}