Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.
@article{arxiv.1510.03148,
title = {Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage},
author = {Vadim Makarov and Jean-Philippe Bourgoin and Poompong Chaiwongkhot and Mathieu Gagné and Thomas Jennewein and Sarah Kaiser and Raman Kashyap and Matthieu Legré and Carter Minshull and Shihan Sajeed},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1510.03148},
year = {2016}
}
Comments
Changed the title to match the journal version. 9 pages, 5 figures