Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures
Theoretical Economics
2019-11-11 v1
Abstract
Two extensive game structures with imperfect information are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the same map (up to relabelings) from profiles of structurally reduced strategies to induced terminal paths. We show that this is the case if and only if one can be transformed into the other through a composition of two elementary transformations, commonly known as \textquotedblleft Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves\textquotedblright\ and \textquotedblleft Coalescing Moves/Sequential Agent Splitting.\textquotedblright
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.1911.02918,
title = {Behavioral Equivalence of Extensive Game Structures},
author = {Pierpaolo Battigalli and Paolo Leonetti and Fabio Maccheroni},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.02918},
year = {2019}
}
Comments
22 pp