Related papers: Connectivity and equilibrium in random games
We study an evolutionary version of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where the agents are placed in a random graph. For lattices with fixed connectivity, $\alpha$, we show that for low values of $\alpha$ the final density of cooperating…
This work considers stochastic differential games with a large number of players, whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. We develop a new framework to prove convergence…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players $n$. Our main result states that for $n$-player binary-action games and for constant $\varepsilon$, the query complexity of an…
We show that there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in anonymous games with any fixed number of strategies (a very broad and important class of games), extending the two-strategy result of Daskalakis…
We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost…
We address Nash equilibrium problems in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only exchange information with some neighbors, while its cost function possibly depends on the strategies of all agents. We characterize…
We consider the framework of aggregative games, in which the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. As first contribution, we investigate the relations between the concepts of Nash…
We consider existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria in an $N$-player game of utility maximization under relative performance criteria of multiplicative form in complete semimartingale markets. For a large class of players' utility…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
This short paper concerns discretization schemes for representing and computing approximate Nash equilibria, with emphasis on graphical games, but briefly touching on normal-form and poly-matrix games. The main technical contribution is a…
We consider finite $n$-person deterministic graphical games and study the existence of pure stationary Nash-equilibrium in such games. We assume that all infinite plays are equivalent and form a unique outcome, while each terminal position…
Observable games are game situations that reach one of possibly many Nash equilibria. Before an instance of the game starts, an external observer does not know, a priori, what is the exact profile of actions that will occur; thus, he…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
We study a network extension to the Nash bargaining game, as introduced by Kleinberg and Tardos (STOC'08), where the set of players corresponds to vertices in a graph $G=(V,E)$ and each edge $ij\in E$ represents a possible deal between…
In this article we compute analytically the number of Nash Equilibria (NE) for a two-choice game played on a (circular) ladder graph with $2n$ players. We consider a set of games with generic payoff parameters, with the only requirement…
This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a random network with nodes Poissonly distributed on a unit square and a pair of nodes directly connected following a generic random connection model to be asymptotically almost…
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is an equilibrium strategy that is immune to invasions by rare alternative (``mutant'') strategies. Unlike Nash equilibria, ESS do not always exist in finite games. In this paper we address the…
An axiomatic characterization of Nash equilibrium is provided for games in normal form. The Nash equilibrium correspondence is shown to be fully characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms, two of which are inspired by contraction and…
We show that the problem of finding an {\epsilon}-approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter {\epsilon} is exponentially small in the number of players.