Related papers: New directions in mechanism design
Mechanism design has long been a cornerstone of economic theory, with traditional approaches relying on mathematical derivations. Recently, automated approaches, including differentiable economics with neural networks, have emerged for…
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer…
Under the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, coalitions of participants can influence the auction outcome to obtain higher collective profit. These manipulations were proven to be eliminated if and only if the market…
In traditional mechanism design, agents only care about the utility they derive from the outcome of the mechanism. We look at a richer model where agents also assign non-negative dis-utility to the information about their private types…
We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We…
Collaborative learning techniques have the potential to enable training machine learning models that are superior to models trained on a single entity's data. However, in many cases, potential participants in such collaborative schemes are…
How does one allocate a collection of resources to a set of strategic agents in a fair and efficient manner without using money? For in many scenarios it is not feasible to use money to compensate agents for otherwise unsatisfactory…
We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…
Activation engineering is becoming increasingly popular as a means of online control of large language models (LLMs). In this work, we extend the idea of inference-time steering with vectors that represent a behavioral direction of interest…
We present a model of truthful elicitation which generalizes and extends mechanisms, scoring rules, and a number of related settings that do not qualify as one or the other. Our main result is a characterization theorem, yielding…
Machine learning systems are increasingly used to support public sector decision-making across a variety of sectors. Given concerns around accountability in these domains, and amidst accusations of intentional or unintentional bias, there…
Consider the problem of allocating goods to buyers through an auction. An auction is efficient if the resulting allocation maximizes total welfare, conditional on the information available. If buyers have private values, the…
Logic is playing an increasingly important role in the engineering of real-time, hybrid, and cyber-physical systems, but mostly in the form of posterior verification and high-level analysis. The core methodology in the design of real-world…
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allocation, is the Combinatorial Auctioning System (CAS). We…
Efficient and fair spectrum allocation is a central challenge in 6G networks, where massive connectivity and heterogeneous services continuously compete for limited radio resources. We investigate the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) as…
We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement…
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite graph with jobs on one side and machines on the other.…
A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. The first such mechanism was…