Related papers: New directions in mechanism design
In many situations, several agents need to make a sequence of decisions. For example, a group of workers that needs to decide where their weekly meeting should take place. In such situations, a decision-making mechanism must consider…
Economies and societal structures in general are complex stochastic systems which may not lend themselves well to algebraic analysis. An addition of subjective value criteria to the mechanics of interacting agents will further complicate…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
Modern computer systems are highly configurable, with the total variability space sometimes larger than the number of atoms in the universe. Understanding and reasoning about the performance behavior of highly configurable systems, over a…
Deceptive patterns are often used in interface design to manipulate users into taking actions they would not otherwise take, such as consenting to excessive data collection. We present Trickery, a narrative serious game that incorporates…
Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such…
This paper explores the application of large language models (LLMs) in designing strategic mechanisms -- including auctions, contracts, and games -- for specific purposes in communication networks. Traditionally, strategic mechanism design…
Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and…
Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) to aggregate multiple preferences has attracted considerable research attention. With aggregation algorithms advancing, a potential economic scenario arises where fine-tuning services are provided to…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes of set systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational agents, and the…
In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of…
Coordination mechanisms aim to mitigate the impact of selfishness when scheduling jobs to different machines. Such a mechanism defines a scheduling policy within each machine and naturally induces a game among the selfish job owners. The…
Current research on visual analytics systems largely follows the research paradigm of interactive system design in the field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), and includes key methodologies including design requirement development based…
Mechanism design has traditionally assumed that the set of participants are fixed and known to the mechanism (the market owner) in advance. However, in practice, the market owner can only directly reach a small number of participants (her…
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design studies procurement auctions where the auctioneer (buyer) aims to maximize his valuation function subject to a hard budget constraint. We study the problem of designing truthful mechanisms…
VCG is a classical combinatorial auction that maximizes social welfare. However, while the standard single-item Vickrey auction is false-name-proof, a major failure of multi-item VCG is its vulnerability to false-name attacks. This occurs…
Auction design for the modern advertising market has gained significant prominence in the field of game theory. With the recent rise of auto-bidding tools, an increasing number of advertisers in the market are utilizing these tools for…