Related papers: New directions in mechanism design
We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several problems,including the design of externality resistant…
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…
Renewable power sources have low marginal pro-duction costs, but may result in high balancing costs due to the inherent production uncertainty. Current day-ahead markets elicit only point production profiles and neglect the degree of…
We develop a versatile methodology for multidimensional mechanism design that incorporates side information about agents to generate high welfare and high revenue simultaneously. Side information sources include advice from domain experts,…
We study a multi-round welfare-maximising mechanism design problem in instances where agents do not know their values. On each round, a mechanism first assigns an allocation each to a set of agents and charges them a price; at the end of…
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
We study truthful mechanisms for matching and related problems in a partial information setting, where the agents' true utilities are hidden, and the algorithm only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the…
Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help discover new theorems. Computer scientists have applied mechanized reasoning to economic problems but -- to date -- this work has not yet been properly presented in economics…
We investigate {\em multidimensional covering mechanism-design} problems, wherein there are $m$ items that need to be covered and $n$ agents who provide covering objects, with each agent $i$ having a private cost for the covering objects he…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule once. We present a general…
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…
Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of…
One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for combinatorial…
We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et al. [CDW13b], simple auctions for additive buyers [HN12], and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand bidders…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…
We consider a multi-round auction setting motivated by pay-per-click auctions for Internet advertising. In each round the auctioneer selects an advertiser and shows her ad, which is then either clicked or not. An advertiser derives value…
Unbiased and objective architectural design decisions are crucial for the success of a software development project. Stakeholder inputs play an important role in arriving at such design decisions. However, the stakeholders may act in a…