Related papers: Selfish vs. Unselfish Optimization of Network Crea…

We model the formation of networks as the result of a game where by players act selfishly to get the portfolio of links they desire most. The integration of player strategies into the network formation model is appropriate for…

We introduce a simple network model that is inspired by social information networks such as twitter. Agents are nodes, connecting to another agent by building a directed edge has a cost, and reaching other agents via short directed paths…

Creating new ties in a social network facilitates knowledge exchange and affects positional advantage. In this paper, we study the process, which we call network building, of establishing ties between two existing social networks in order…

We study network formation with the bilateral link formation rule (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) with $n$ players and link cost $\alpha>0$. After the network is built, an adversary randomly destroys one link according to a certain probability…

Communities are an important feature of social networks. The goal of this paper is to propose a mathematical model to study the community structure in social networks. For this, we consider a particular case of a social network, namely…

We consider a sharing economy network where agents embedded in a graph share their resources. This is a fundamental model that abstracts numerous emerging applications of collaborative consumption systems. The agents generate a random…

Even though the problem of network topology design is often studied as a "clean-slate" optimization, in practice most service-provider and enterprise networks are designed incrementally over time. This evolutionary process is driven by…

We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with…

Although most networks in nature exhibit complex topology the origins of such complexity remains unclear. We introduce a model of a growing network of interacting agents in which each new agent's membership to the network is determined by…

This paper develops strategic foundations for an important statistical model of random networks with heterogeneous expected degrees. Based on this, we show how social networking services that subtly alter the costs and indirect benefits of…

We investigate a dynamic model of network marketing in a small-world network structure artificially constructed similarly to the Watts-Strogatz network model. Different from the traditional marketing, consumers can also play the role of the…

The seceder model illustrates how the desire to be different than the average can lead to formation of groups in a population. We turn the original, agent based, seceder model into a model of network evolution. We find that the structural…

Closeness is a global measure of centrality in networks, and a proxy for how influential actors are in social networks. In most network models, and many empirical networks, closeness is strongly correlated with degree. However, in social…

We study network formation with n players and link cost \alpha > 0. After the network is built, an adversary randomly deletes one link according to a certain probability distribution. Cost for player v incorporates the expected number of…

We study selfish routing games where users can choose between regular and priority service for each network edge on their chosen path. Priority users pay an additional fee, but in turn they may travel the edge prior to non-priority users,…

We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations…

Social movements, neurons in the brain or even industrial suppliers are best described by agents evolving on networks with basic interaction rules. In these real systems, the connectivity between agents corresponds to the a critical state…

We analyze the network congestion game with atomic players, asymmetric strategies, and the maximum latency among all players as social cost. This important social cost function is much less understood than the average latency. We show that…

An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…

We consider the dynamic behavior of several variants of the Network Creation Game, introduced by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03]. Equilibrium networks in these models have desirable properties like low social cost and small diameter, which makes…