Related papers: Selfish vs. Unselfish Optimization of Network Crea…
Recently, cellular networks are severely overloaded by social-based services, such as YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, in which thousands of clients subscribe a common content provider (e.g., a popular singer) and download his/her content…
Communication networks are essential for our economy and our everyday lives. This makes them lucrative targets for attacks. Today, we see an ongoing battle between criminals that try to disrupt our key communication networks and security…
This paper studies controlling segregation in social networks via exogenous incentives. We construct an edge formation game on a directed graph. A user (node) chooses the probability with which it forms an inter- or intra- community edge…
Influence maximization serves as the main goal of a variety of social network activities such as viral marketing and campaign advertising. The independent cascade model for the influence spread assumes a one-time chance for each activated…
An agent acquires a costly flexible signal before making a decision. We explore to what degree knowledge of the agent's information costs helps predict her behavior. We establish an impossibility result: learning costs alone generate no…
An agent choosing between various actions tends to take the one with the lowest cost. But this choice is arguably too rigid (not adaptive) to be useful in complex situations, e.g., where exploration-exploitation trade-off is relevant in…
Today's networks consist of many autonomous entities that follow their own objectives, i.e., smart devices or parts of large AI systems, that are interconnected. Given the size and complexity of most communication networks, each entity…
This paper studies whether a planner who only has information about the network topology can discriminate among agents according to their network position. The planner proposes a simple menu of contracts, one for each location, in order to…
A model of Boolean game with only one free parameter $p$ that denotes the strength of herd behavior is proposed where each agent acts according to the information obtained from his neighbors in network and those in the minority are…
Consider a setting where $N$ players, partitioned into $K$ observable types, form a directed network. Agents' preferences over the form of the network consist of an arbitrary network benefit function (e.g., agents may have preferences over…
Overcoming the impact of selfish behavior of rational players in multiagent systems is a fundamental problem in game theory. Without any intervention from a central agent, strategic users take actions in order to maximize their personal…
In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a…
We study an asynchronous online learning setting with a network of agents. At each time step, some of the agents are activated, requested to make a prediction, and pay the corresponding loss. The loss function is then revealed to these…
With advances in generative AI, decision-making agents can now dynamically create new actions during online learning, but action generation typically incurs costs that must be balanced against potential benefits. We study an online learning…
We consider a group of agents who can each take an irreversible costly action whose payoff depends on an unknown state. Agents learn about the state from private signals, as well as from past actions of their social network neighbors, which…
We consider agents in a social network competing to be selected as partners in collaborative, mutually beneficial activities. We study this through a model in which an agent i can initiate a limited number k_i>0 of games and selects the…
People choose friendships with people similar to themselves, i.e. they sort by resemblence. Economic studies have shown when sorting is optimal and constitute an equilibrium, however, this presumes lack of beneficial spillovers. We…
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function…
Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists, due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the theoretical counterpart of…