Related papers: The Complexity of Agreement
Large language models are increasingly deployed as cooperating agents, yet their behavior in adversarial consensus settings has not been systematically studied. We evaluate LLM-based agents on a Byzantine consensus game over scalar values…
During the last decades, quite a number of interacting particle systems have been introduced and studied in the border area of mathematics and statistical physics. Some of these can be seen as simplistic models for opinion formation…
In Byzantine agreement with predictions each process begins with an input value and some (unreliable) prediction bits. Recently, it has been shown that with \emph{classification predictions} -- where the predictions predict each process to…
A continuous-opinion model accounting for the social compromise propensity is theoretically and numerically analysed. An agent's opinion is represented by a real number that can be changed through social interactions with her neighbours.…
Border's theorem gives an intuitive linear characterization of the feasible interim allocation rules of a Bayesian single-item environment, and it has several applications in economic and algorithmic mechanism design. All known…
We study games of chance (e.g., pokers, dices, horse races) in the form of agents' first-order posterior beliefs about game outcomes. We ask for any profile of agents' posterior beliefs, is there a game that can generate these beliefs? We…
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn…
Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable promise in communicating with humans. Their potential use as artificial partners with humans in sociological experiments involving conversation is an exciting prospect. But how viable is…
We explore the possibilities of enforcing and preventing consensus in continuous opinion dynamics that result from modifications in the communication rules. We refer to the model of Weisbuch and Deffuant, where $n$ agents adjust their…
A team of mobile agents, starting from different nodes of an unknown network, possibly at different times, have to meet at the same node and declare that they have all met. Agents have different labels and move in synchronous rounds along…
Pimentel et al. (2020) recently analysed probing from an information-theoretic perspective. They argue that probing should be seen as approximating a mutual information. This led to the rather unintuitive conclusion that representations…
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender…
The ``impossibility theorem'' -- which is considered foundational in algorithmic fairness literature -- asserts that there must be trade-offs between common notions of fairness and performance when fitting statistical models, except in two…
We consider the plurality consensus problem among $n$ agents. Initially, each agent has one of $k$ different opinions. Agents choose random interaction partners and revise their state according to a fixed transition function, depending on…
Agents' judgment depends on perception and previous knowledge. Assuming that previous knowledge depends on perception, we can say that judgment depends on perception. So, if judgment depends on perception, can agents judge that they have…
The classic Bayesian persuasion model assumes a Bayesian and best-responding receiver. We study a relaxation of the Bayesian persuasion model where the receiver can approximately best respond to the sender's signaling scheme. We show that,…
Here we focus on the description of the mechanisms behind the process of information aggregation and decision making, a basic step to understand emergent phenomena in society, such as trends, information spreading or the wisdom of crowds.…
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is…
We initiate the study of Bayesian conversations, which model interactive communication between two strategic agents without a mediator. We compare this to communication through a mediator and investigate the settings in which a mediation…
In this technical note, we first clarify a technical issue in the convergence proof of a free-will arbitrary time (FwAT) consensus law proposed recently in Pal et al. IEEE Trans. Cybern. (2020)[1], making the results questionable. We then…