Related papers: Random Stable Matchings
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). In particular, we seek stable matchings that are optimal with respect to profile, which is a vector that indicates the…
Popular matchings provide a model of matching under preferences in which a solution corresponds to a Condorcet winner in voting systems. In a bipartite graph in which the vertices have preferences over their neighbours, a matching is…
In this paper, we study the relations between the numerical structure of the optimal solutions of a convex programming problem defined on the edge set of a simple graph and the stability number (i.e. the maximum size of a subset of pairwise…
This paper has two objectives. One is to give a linear time algorithm that solves the stable roommates problem (i.e., obtains one stable matching) using the stable marriage problem. The idea is that a stable matching of a roommate instance…
I relate bipartite graph matchings to stable matchings. I prove a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a saturating stable matching, where every agent on one side is matched, for all possible preferences. I extend my…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
A geometric graph is a graph whose vertex set is a set of points in the plane and whose edge set contains straight-line segments. A matching in a graph is a subset of edges of the graph with no shared vertices. A matching is called perfect…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…
The graph matching optimization problem is an essential component for many tasks in computer vision, such as bringing two deformable objects in correspondence. Naturally, a wide range of applicable algorithms have been proposed in the last…
The stable roommates problem with $n$ agents has worst case complexity $O(n^2)$ in time and space. Random instances can be solved faster and with less memory, however. We introduce an algorithm that has average time and space complexity…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
For a two-sided ($n$ men/$n$ women) stable matching problem) Gale and Shapley studied a proposal algorithm (men propose/women select, or the other way around), that determines a matching, not blocked by any unmatched pair. Irving used this…
The stable matching problem has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since the seminal 1962 paper by Gale and Shapley. The number of stable matchings for different systems of preferences has been studied in many…
Given two graphs, the graph matching problem is to align the two vertex sets so as to minimize the number of adjacency disagreements between the two graphs. The seeded graph matching problem is the graph matching problem when we are first…
In the Gale-Shapley model of two-sided matching, it is well known that for generic preferences, the outcomes for each side can vary dramatically in the male-optimal vs. female-optimal stable matchings. In this paper, we show that under a…
Coalition formation over graphs is a well studied class of games whose players are vertices and feasible coalitions must be connected subgraphs. In this setting, the existence and computation of equilibria, under various notions of…
This survey paper deals with upper and lower bounds on the number of $k$-matchings in regular graphs on $N$ vertices. For the upper bounds we recall the upper matching conjecture which is known to hold for perfect matchings. For the lower…