Related papers: Random Stable Matchings
The semi-random graph process is a single player game in which the player is initially presented an empty graph on $n$ vertices. In each round, a vertex $u$ is presented to the player independently and uniformly at random. The player then…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph $G=(N,E)$, with an integer vertex capacity function $b$ and an edge weighting $w$. The set $N$ consists of a number of…
Super-stability and strong stability are properties of a matching in the stable matching problem with ties. In this paper, we introduce a common generalization of super-stability and strong stability, which we call non-uniform stability.…
Consider the complete bipartite graph on $n+n$ vertices where the edges are equipped with i.i.d. exponential costs. A matching of the vertices is stable if it does not contain any pair of vertices where the connecting edge is cheaper than…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
In multistage perfect matching problems we are given a sequence of graphs on the same vertex set and asked to find a sequence of perfect matchings, corresponding to the sequence of graphs, such that consecutive matchings are as similar as…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
Graphs provide an efficient tool for object representation in various computer vision applications. Once graph-based representations are constructed, an important question is how to compare graphs. This problem is often formulated as a…
This paper deals with the problem of graph matching or network alignment for Erd\H{o}s--R\'enyi graphs, which can be viewed as a noisy average-case version of the graph isomorphism problem. Let $G$ and $G'$ be $G(n, p)$ Erd\H{o}s--R\'enyi…
A graph with convex quadratic stability number is a graph for which the stability number is determined by solving a convex quadratic program. Since the very beginning, where a convex quadratic programming upper bound on the stability number…
We propose a self-stabilizing algorithm for computing a maximal matching in an anonymous network. The complexity is $O(n^3)$ moves with high probability, under the adversarial distributed daemon. In this algorithm, each node can determine…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
We consider the stable matching problem when the preference lists are not given explicitly but are represented in a succinct way and ask whether the problem becomes computationally easier and investigate other implications. We give…
We study convergence rates of random-order best-response dynamics in games on networks with linear best responses and strategic substitutes. Combining formal analysis with numerical simulations we identify phenomena that lead to slow…
The Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the stable matching problem (SMP) involving complementarities. Although SMP can be solved in polynomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is not…
In this paper, we study the fundamental problem of finding a stable matching in two-sided matching markets. In the classic variant, it is assumed that both sides of the market submit a ranked list of all agents on the other side. However,…
Structural balance theory studies stability in networks. Given a $n$-vertex complete graph $G=(V,E)$ whose edges are labeled positive or negative, the graph is considered \emph{balanced} if every triangle either consists of three positive…