Related papers: Suppression and Empowerment in Contests

I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants. I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

We use techniques from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems to analyse the properties of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games with large random payoff matrices. By means of an annealed bound, we calculate their number and analyse…

In this paper, we present a resource allocation mechanism for the problem of incentivizing filtering among a finite number of strategic social media platforms. We consider the presence of a strategic government and private knowledge of how…

We apply control theoretic and optimization techniques to adaptively design incentives. In particular, we consider the problem of a planner with an objective that depends on data from strategic decision makers. The planner does not know the…

We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2020, arXiv:1907.12408) of the winner-bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a complete information environment, that even though these…

In recent years, self-supervised learning has played a pivotal role in advancing machine learning by allowing models to acquire meaningful representations from unlabeled data. An intriguing research avenue involves developing…

We simulate behaviour of two independent reinforcement learning algorithms playing the Crawford and Sobel (1982) game of strategic information transmission. We adopt memoryless algorithms to capture learning in a static game where a large…

This paper explores distributed aggregative games in multi-agent systems. Current methods for finding distributed Nash equilibrium require players to send original messages to their neighbors, leading to communication burden and privacy…

Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing…

The distribution of efficient individuals in the economy and the efforts that they will put in if they are hired, there are two important concerns for a technologically advanced firm. wants to open a new branch. The firm does not have…

Benchmark hacking refers to tuning a machine learning model to score highly on certain evaluation criteria without improving true generalization or faithfully solving the intended problem. We study this phenomenon in a generic machine…

When opposing parties compete for a prize, the sunk effort players exert during the conflict can affect the value of the winner's reward. These spillovers can have substantial influence on the equilibrium behavior of participants in…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced in Seel and Strack [J. Econom. Theory 148 (2013) 2033-2048]. In the Seel-Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and…

We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…

Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…

Best-response mechanisms (Nisan, Schapira, Valiant, Zohar, 2011) provide a unifying framework for studying various distributed protocols in which the participants are instructed to repeatedly best respond to each others' strategies. Two…

We investigate the effects of competition in a problem of resource extraction from a common source with diffusive dynamics. In the symmetric version with identical extraction rates we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium where the…

This paper reports experimental data describing the dynamics of three key information-sharing outcomes: quantity of information shared, falsification and accuracy. The experimental design follows a formal model predicting that cooperative…